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IN THE S U P E M E COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO
BRUCE TIEGS, individually and as co-personal
Representative of the Estate of Qnneth Tiegs;
5TlWEN TIEGS; and SUSAN HUTER,
individually and as co-personal representative
of the Estate of Gnneth Tiegs, and K.P. INC.,
an Idaho corporation,
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Supreme Court No. 35921

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Defendant.
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., as
subrogee of UN1GAR.D INSURANCE,
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Plaintiff-Respondent,
DUSTIN M. KUKLA,
Defendant,
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho.
HONORABLE GORDON W. PETRIE, Presiding
Rodney R. Saetrum and David W. Lloyd, SAETRUM LAW OFFICES,
P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707
Attorneys for Appellant
Eric S. Rossman and Chad M. Nicholson, ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC,
737 N. 7th Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
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Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
R O S S W LAW CROW, PLLC
737 N, 7thStreet
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 33 1-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2 170
Terrence R. White, ISB # 1351
WHITE PETERSON
5700 East Franklin Rd, Suite 200
Natnpa, Idaho 83687
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
BRUCE TIEGS, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; STEWN TIEGS; and
SUSAN KUTER, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; and K. P. Inc., an Idaho
corporation,

1
1
)
)

CASE NO. CV 04-4001
AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS
FOR
SUMMTIRY
JUDGMENT

)

Plaintiffs,
VS.
DUSTIN M. KUKLA; and DAEUELL L.
ROBERTSON,
Defendants.

)

1

)

1
)

AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

County of Ada

: SS
)

ERICA S. PHILLIPS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I m one of the attorneys for the PlaintiRs in the above-entitled matter and

make this Afidavit for and on behalf of said Plaintiffs.

2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference is

a true and correct copy of Defendant Michael Kukla's Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs' First

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference

are true and correct copies of the letters received from Shane Beus of Beus Dairy, Edward
Vangrouw of Vangrouw Dairy and Jim Slegers of Sundance Dairy in response to the Subpoenas
served on them in this matter.

4.

I recall speaking with one of the dairy owners whom I believe was John

5.

During this conversation, Mr. Toledo informed me that he had not

Toledo.

purchased any straw from any of the parties listed in the subpoena.

6.

I requested confmation of this in writing; however it does not appear that

Mr. Toledo ever provided such a letter to Plaintiffs.

AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by this reference is

a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the transcript of the deposition of Darrell
Robertson t&en on March 11,2005.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this reference is

a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the transcript of the deposition of Dustin Kukla

taken on April 26,2005.
FURTHER YOUR MFLANT SAYEW NAUGHT.
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Erica S. Phillips
SUBSCRIBED AM) SWORN to before me this

22I$ day of February, 2006.

MY commission expires:

41(&

AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

CERTEFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

AFFIDAVIT OF EMCA S. PHILLIPS INOPPOSITION TO DEFENANTS' MOTIONS FOR
S

Y JUDGMENT was served upon the following:

Rodney R. S a e t m
David W. Lloyd
SMTRUM LAW OFFICES
300 E. Mallad Drive, Suite 370
Boise, ID 83706

/

V'

J. Nick Craw;Ebrd
BRASSEY W m E L L GRAWORD
& GARRETT
203 W. Main Street
Boise, ID 83702

this

Mailed
Faxed
Hand Delivered

-~Eiielivered

3
'
'day of February, 2006.
*

.

/!lL&&,,

Erica S, Phillips

AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

EXHIBIT "A"

J. Nick Crawford, ESB No. 3220
Jolm M. Howell, ISB No. 6234
BMSSEY, W T m R E L L , CMWE;Om & G
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 8370 1- 1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077

TT

Attorneys for Defendant Mike Kukla

IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICXAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN
BRUCE TIECS, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIECS; and
SUSAN HUTER, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; and K.P. Inc., an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

Case No. CV 04-400 1

DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST
INTERROGATORIES AND
mQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUNZENTS

DUSTIN M. K W A ; DARRELL L,
ROBERTSON; and MICHAEL D.
KUKLA
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Michael Kukla, Defendant above named, by and through counsel of record,
Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and
supplemental his responses to Plaintiffs' First interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents propounded herein as follows:

DEFENDANTMICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTALANSWE% TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 1

INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the full name, address, employer, title, and position of
each person who has knowledge o f the facts of said occurrences or of the injuries and damages
following Iherefiom and the substance of each person's knowledge.

SUPPLEMENT& ANSVVER TO INTEmOGATORY NO. 1:
9.

Nate Pancheri: Mr. Pancheri has information related to liability.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please provide copies of any and all W-2 forms,
payroll documents, or other documents that specifically identifj: by name and amounts paid, the
amounts set forth as deductions for labor expenses of any kind on your 2003 tax returns.

SUPPLEMENTm RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Attached,
please find an itemized accounting of all payments made by Kukla Farming to its employees in 2003.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please provide any and ail profit and loss
statements prepared for your farming operations in the year 2003 which identify amounts paid for
labor expenses.

SUPPLEMENTU RESPONSE TO REQUEST FORPRODUCTION NO. 4: Attached,
please find an itemized accounting of all payments made by Kukla Farming to its employees in 2003.

DEFENDANT MICHAELKUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTALANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 2

DATED this

2+Lday of February, 2006.

v

t meys for Defendant M k e Kukla

CERTImCATE OF SERVICE

rl

I HEMBY CERTIFY that on this
day of February, 2006, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO
PLAXNTIFFS' FIRST INTEIIROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the
method and to the addresses indicated below:
Eric S. Rossmm
Erica S. Phillips
ROSSMAN, LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Terrence R. White
W I T E PETERSON
5700 East Franklin Rd., Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Rodney R. S a e t m ~
David W. Lloyd
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
300 E. Mallard Drive, Suite 370
Boise, Idaho 83706

A S , Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
- Facsimile (208) 342-2 170

/U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 466-4405

/U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 336-0448

DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTALANSWERSTO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORLES
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 3

Transaction Detail 5 y Account
January &rough December 2003
_-?YE-_Wagetl
1
Payclrehk
PayeheCk
PaMe~k
PeyGho k
PwhelX
Paychwk
Payohctk

Tz;lyche$k
Payohe!k
Paychem
Peychetk
Paychekk
Payche~k
Paychepk
Paycho k
peych&k
Paychekk

Peychebk
Paychekk
Paychebk
Paychekk
PayeheiCk
Paychdck
paych&k
Peychelck
Payche/&k
Paycheck
Peyche(ck
Paycheck
Paycheck
Pay~h€jcjtl(
Paychekk
Paychdck
P~ychBtk
Paychdck
Paychhlck
Paycheck
Paych$ck
Paychdck
Paychcick
Paychjck
Payeneck
Peychqck
Paychqck
Paycheck
Peyche'ck
paycbdck
Total wagk
TOTAL
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Num..-
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-..-Batanor,
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AriZmerrdi, Robem A
~obortoA.
Ayala, Udal S.
sotolo, Jslm A
Aflzmctndl, Roberto A.
Ayala, UtW 5.
Sotelo, Jaime A
A y a l , Ascenlon S.
Arismandl, Angel A.
ArizmOnUi, ~ o b t r t A.
o
Ayala. AscettiOn S
Ayah, Ascenlon S.
Ayala, Uriel S
Sotelo, Jatme 9
Ayeb, Marc0 $.
Merndes, Marcas
Solalo, Jaime A
Mendaa, Marcds
Sotelo. Jaime A
Ayela, Matco S.
Ayala, Marco S.
Mendes. Marcos
Sotelo, Jaime A
Ayala S.,Jorge A
Ayala, Marco S
Ayela, Marw S.
Mendes. Marc03
Sotelo, Jaime A
Ayala S.. Jorge A.
Ayala, Marc0 S
Mendes, Marcos
Solelo, Jaime A
Ayala S.,Jorge A.
Ayala, Marco S.
Mendes, Marcos
Sotelo, Ja~meA
Ayala S., Jorge A
Guadarama, Ram~m
Solelo, Jaime A
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Sotelo, Jaime A
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Guadafarna, Ramiro
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EXHIBIT "B"

To Whom i t May Concern,
I, Shane Beus, have never pur .hiled hay or straw from Dustin Kukla, Michael
KuMa, Damell Robertson or 1laf i Pancheri.

Shane Beus
1580 W. Kuna Cave Rd.
Kuna, Idaho 83634
208 922 5968

Van Grouw Dairy
Ed and Anne Van Grouw
19855 S. Cloverdale Rd
Kuna, Idaho 83634
Date:

i a- 22

- OA-

Time:

3:03

Py

From: Van Grouw Dairy
Fax# 208-362-9793
Phone: 208-362-4134

-

Total # of Pages

I

PAGE
Cs.

.

I

I

01

EXHIBIT "C"

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

BRUCE TIEGS, individually and as
co-personal representative of the
Estate of Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN
TIEGS; and SUSAN HUNTER,
individually and as co-personal
representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; and K.P. Inc., an
Idaho corporation,

/

)
)

I

Case No. CV 04-4001

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

I
I

DUSTIN M. KUKLA; and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,

j
)
)
I
)
)
\

Defendants.
------------------- --------------

DEPOSITION OF DARRELL L. ROBERTSON

March 11, 2005
Boise, Idaho
Reported By:

Amy Menlove, CSR No. 685, RPR, CRR

COPY

1618 W Jefferson r Boise Idaho r 83702
(800) 588-3370 r (208) 343-4004 v (208) 343-4002 Fax

000381

I

Darrell Robertson

1

March I I , 2005

Nlr. Kukla?

Tiegs v. Kulda

1
2

Q. Is that in Kuna?
A. Yes,

4

4

5

5

A. 1 live there. I drove by it e v a y day.
Q. You lived in the area?

people every day at the coffee shop,
Q. Okay, And when you say you saw him every
6 day, that would have been at the Super C coffee shop?
7
A. He just come in and sat down at a near table

12 Mr. KuMa's history in any way?
13
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Did you know of his criminal history?
14
15
A. Absolutely not.
16
Q. Did you know of any of his driving record?
17
A. Absolutely not.
18
Q. Did you know of his farming history?
19
A. His father's history, but not his.
Q. Okay. Did you know of his farming practices?
20
21
A. Absolutely not.
22
Q. Did you know if he was a good f m e r or bad
23 farmer?
24
A. I assumed good because his father was good.
Q. Okay. But you didn't know with regard to
25

6
7
8
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. I don't know where he lived, but I knew where
his fann was.
Q. I guess the question I'm asking is how did

A. Because he was doing the work.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether his father had
s i ~ e the
d lease or had any interest in the property or
the farming operation?
A. I knew nothing of their business.
Q. From driving by this farm on Hubbard Road,
what type of crop was being grown?
A. Sugar beets.
Q. And from driving by and observing Mr. Kukla,
his farm, did you develop an understanding as to his
farming practices, habits?
A. Your opinion changed.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, it wasn't as shiny as you'd assumed it
would have been.

Page 17

1 Dustin KuMa?
2
A. Well, I assumed that he followed in his dad's
3 footsteps as far as his talents in farming.
4
Q. And that assumption was based upon your
5 knowledge of Mike KuMa?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Was there anything from your discussions with
8 Dustin KuMa between April and July of 2003 that gave
9 you any indication as to his farming practices?
10
A. Not by talking to him.
11
Q. Okay. From any other -- in any other manner?
12
A. Driving by his farm, it's simple to see.
13
Q. Driving by whose farm?
14
A. His farm.
15
Q. Dustin's farm?
16
A. Yes.
Q.
Do you know if that was Dustin's farm or his
17
18 father's farm?
19
A. Dustin's farm.
Q. Do you know where that was located?
20
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Where?
23
A. Hubbard Road.
24
Q. What city is that?
25
A. It was a rented farm.

Page 19

1

Q. Well, what about it told you it wasn't as

2 shiny as you would have assumed it should have been?
3
A. Weeds, didn't look good.
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. When was that that you drove by and observed
that?
A. Every day.
Q. This whole time period?
A. Yeah.
Q. That was between April and July of '03?
A. But I didn't know if it was because he was
out of money and he couldn't afford to have this done or
if it was just character. He never put on like it was
his character. I just assumed he was out of money.
Q. Okay. Did you communicate with him about any
problems that he might be having in farming that
operation?
A. No.
Q. Was there anything else from your discussions
with Dustin and your observations between April and July
of 2003 that gave you an indication as to his farming
practices?
A. Startover.
Q. Was there anything else from your discussions
or observations between April and July of '03 that gave
you any indication about Mr. KuMa's farming practices?

4 (Pages 16 to 19)

Associated Reporting, Inc.
208-343-4004

1

i .

Dane11 Robertson

Ticgs v. Kdda

1 circle them.
Q. I'll show you the color picture.

2
4

Does that refresh your recollection at all?

Q. Bottom right corner --

4

9 that these exhibits are black and white, do you
10 recopize that as your baler?
11
A. I don't recognize the baler yet, but I

A. I can't remember if them are reflectors up

12 recognize the tractor attached to it.
MR. LLOYD: Okay. Testify accordingly.
14
THE W m S S : The tires.

9 ones, those you know are reflectors?
10
A. 1 know these are too.
11
Q. All right.
A. But maybe that one is too.
12
13
Q. And do you know how long -- had those
14 reflectors been located on that baler and the trailer to

16 or-17
A. Yes.
I8
Q. Are there my differences in appearance
19 between the baler that you owned that we've been talking
20 about in this deposition and the baler that you can see
2 1 in those photographs?
A. Looks the same.
22
23
Q. If you look at the third page in, page 0056,
24 bottom right comer -25
A. Yes.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

13

the equipment?
A. Well, if they're there now, they were there
when I bought it.
Q. Did you ever replace or modi& those
reflectors in any way after you bought the equipment?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever repair the reflectors in any way
after you bought the equipment?
A. No.
Q. From your experience in farming practices, is

Page 37

1
Q. Can you take my pen and circle for me every
2 reflector that is located on that baler, to your
3 knowledge?
A. I don't know if the bottom one or the top one
4
5 is -- I think it's the top one, isn't it? I can't tell
6 by these pictures. Oh, there they are.
7
h4R. ROSSMAN: Let's go off the record.
8
(Discussion held off the record.)
9
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) So you're looking at a
10 color photograph that is the same photograph that we saw
11 on page 56 of Exhibit 2; is that correct?
A. There is -- also our -- they're the lower
12
13 ones. And I don't know, is this top one a reflector
14 too?
15
Q. I'm just asking your recollection, not your
16 lawyer's. I just want to know from you.
17
Do you recall all of the reflectors that are
18 located on the back of that baler?
A. Well, there was four.
19
20
Q. Okay. So we see two at the bottom, page 56,
21 bottom?
A. Yes.
22
Q. And then you see two more on the cab, but
23
24 you're not sure where exactly there?
25
A. I could go home and look and come back and

Page 39

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

hay baling typically performed in the evening hours
after sunset?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the reason for that?
A. Get the light off of it and just toughens it
up so everything doesn't shatter and fall apart.
Q. I want to talk to you about when Dustin KuMa
came to you about July 24th or 25th of 2003.
Did he borrow the tractor and the baler that
we've been talking about in this deposition?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me everything you recall about that
particular discussion you had with Dustin.
k He had bought some straw from Shroll and his
grandpa's baler wasn't running. He was going to use his
grandpa's baler. And Shrolls were giving him trouble
about getting that one field off.
And I says, "Well, go see your grandpa and
see if he's going to have that one running."
And then he come back and said he didn't.
I said, "Well, I'm using mine."
He goes, "Well, that's not a problem. I'll
go finish yours."
And so that day was hazy, so we could bale
during the day on the straw. And he finished baling
9 (Pages 36 to 39)

Associated Reporting, Inc.
208-343-4004

000383

March 1 1,2005

1
A. It was on it.
2
Q. Okay. Wow long did this conversation with
3 Dustin KuMa last?
4
A. Minute.

2

Q. And, in fact, he borrowed it about four to

5

Q. Did you give him any instructions during rhe

7

7
8

A. No.
Q. Now, you testified that your practice has
9 been with that baler that you don't trmsport it at

or transportation of the baler?

8
A. No. The conversation didn't go that far. It
9 was just a matter of borrowing it.
10
Q. So you said, "Go ahead and borrow it"?
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Tiegs v. Kukla

Q. What did you say?
A. I said, "If your grandpa's baler is not
fixed, then we'll talk about it."
Q. And he indicated that his grandpa's baler
wasn't fixed?
A. Right, on the phone.
Q. And then you said, "I'm using it. I've got
hay I need to bale"?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was that hay?
A. On Kuna-Meridian Highway.
Q. Where on Kuna-Meridian Highway?
A. South of Deer Flat on Kuna-Meridian Highway,
quarter of a mile.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. No.
Q. You were concerned about transporting it at
night because of it's lack of lighting; correct?
A, Yes.
Q. Did you understand what the legal
requkaents were for transporting a baler such as that
at night?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your understanding at the time?
A. Need lights.
Q. Need lights from the front and the rear;
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the reason -- did you have an
understanding as to how much the baler and the tractor
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Q. How far is that from the Shroll property?
A. Must be eight miles. That's just a guess.
Q. Okay.
A. And that was a straight shot. It wasn't like
we had to weave through the countryside.
Q. Straight shot on the Kuna-Meridian Highway?
A. On Kuna-Meridian Road, pretty much straight.
Couple turns, but that's it.
Q. And he borrowed your tractor as well?
A. Yes. You just don't swap from tractor to
tractor.
Q. So the tractor was already connected to the
baler, you said just borrow the whole thing.
A. That's assumable when you take a baler.
Q. All right. And the trailer portion at the
back of the baler, is that part of the baler or is that
a separate component?
A. It's an add-on called an accumulator.
Q. Did the accumulator ever have any lighting
sources other than the two reflectors?
A. No.
Q. And did you buy the accumulator at the time
that you bought the baler?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have it added on or was it already --

Page 5 1

1 together weighed at that point in time?
A. No idea.
2
3
Q. Did you wlcferstand that it weighed tens of
4 thousands of pounds'?
5
A. M e r we weighed it I knew what it weighed.
Q. Before that did you have an understanding or
6
7 belief?
A. No.
8
9
Q. You understood it was very heavy equipment;
10 correct?
A. Yes.
11
12
Q. And if something impacted into that
13 equipment, it could cause very serious damage?
A. Yes.
14
Q. Did you have an understanding as to what the
15
16 maximum speed was for that tractor pulling that baler?
A. I knew what it was.
17
18
Q. What was it?
19
A. 18.
20
Q. 18 miles per hour?
A. On the computer it's 18. I don't know what
21
22 the actual speed is. I don't have a radar.
23
Q. When you say "computer," what do you -24
A. Tractor computer.
25
Q. Inside the tractor has a computer.
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A. Yes.
Q. And it has a speedometer?
A. It has WMs.

A. It. falls under common sense.
Q. In your mind, it falls under common sense
3 that he wouldn't do k t ?

1
2

A. 18. It would go up to 19 if you were going
down the hill.
Yes.
Q. And so the maximum speed would be 19 if you
were going down a hill?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, you testified earlier that you
understood that transporting that baler with that
tractor in the middle of the night with the lighting
conditions on that baler would be extremely dangerous;
is that correct?
A. You don't do it.
MR. LLOYD: Objection. I think that misstates his
testimony.
You can answer if you can.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Would you have considered
that to be extremely dangerous?
A. Yes. You don't do it.
Q. Did you have any conversation with Dustin
A.

5
Q. Do you know whether Dustin Kukla knew about
6 whether or not the lighting sources on the baler were
7 working the night of July 30th, 2003?
8
A. Weknew.
9
Q. How do you know that?
10
A. Because he was running it after dark.
11
Q. And if he's running it after dark, how would
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
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21
22
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24
25

he know whether or not the lighting on the back of the
baler was operational?
A. Because, see, in the middle of the night when
you're baling straw, you'll be up and down this ladder
about every ten bales to reset the knotters. We have a
flashlight inside the cab. You crawl up there, you pull
it down, stick it in your mouth, run it down the chamber
and go back to baling. And if he baled any at all, he
knew. He crawled up that ladder to fix it.
Q. Did you talk to Dustin at any time to find
out whether or not he'd been around behind the back of
thebaler?
A. I knew he had.
Q. How did you know that?
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KuMa about transporting that baler at night?
A.No.
Q. Did you have any conversation with Dustin
KuMa about the lighting on that baler?
A. No.
Q. Did you at any time tell Dustin KuMa, "You
can take it but don't transport it at night"?
A.No.
Q. There are farmers with proper lighting on
bailers that will transport bailers at night; correct?
A. Yes, but over the years they've made comments
about how uncomfortable that is.
Q. Had you ever had a conversation with Dustin
KuMa about the safety of transporting a baler at night?
A. No. But we don't even move tractors at night
to speak of.
Q. Do you know whether or not Dustin KuMa moved
tractors at night at that point in time?
A. No, never seen it.
Q. You didn't know what his habits and practices
were as far as transporting farm equipment at that point
in time; correct?
A. No.
Q. And you made no inquiry with anyone to find
out before you loaned him the equipment; correct?
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A. Because you do not bale without having to
deal with that.
Q. Let me ask you, do you know whether or not
Dustin had been back to the back of that baler the night
of July 30th, 2003?
A. I never physically saw him, but you do not do
it without having to walk around checking needles and -Q. Okay. And you understood that there is a
counter in the baler that shows how many bales had been
baled by Dustin since he borrowed it; right?
A. It's inside the cab on the computer.
Q. And you understood that he'd baled about 115
bales; correct?
A. Surprised me, yes.
Q. That's a pretty low figure?
A. Very low.
Q. You expected that there would have been a lot
more bales than that?
A. If I'd have borrowed a baler because I was in
trouble I'd have been on that baler -- I'd have lived on
that baler.
Q. Do you know how many of those bales were
baled at night?
A. No.
Q. Do you know when Mr. KuWa baled any of those
13 (Pages 52 to 55)
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1
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4
5
6

7

Q. How many miles did you need to travel on
M c D m o t t to get to the Shroll p r o p m ?
A. Probably two, three miles.
Q. Okay. And what is the speed limit on that

9

A. It's 50.

10

Q. And what is the terrain?
A. McDemott has a little bit of a hill to it.

II

transportation of the baler?
A. No.
3
Q. Did he tell you when you could and couldn't
4 transporl the baler?
5
A. No.
6
Q. Did he ask you if you'd had any experience
7 baling properties, baling straw?
8
A. Not that I can r m m k him ever asking me.
9
Q. Did he ask you if you knew when it was
10 best -- when was the best time to transport a 20,000

IS
A. Yes, because he folIowed me over there and
16 gave me a ride back to Kuna to get my pickup.
17
Q. Okay. Did Mr. Robertson ask you if you were

18 going to be taking it anywhere else, the baler?
19
A. No.
20
Q. Did he ask you if you were going to be
21 f m i n g or baling any other properties?
A. No.
22
23
Q. Did he ask you if anybody else was going to
24 be helping you?
25
A. No.

15
A. No.
16
Q. Did he tell you it would be unsafe to
17 t r a n s p o ~that at night?
18
A. No, because balers are moved at night because
19 you could bale hay at night.
20
Q. And when you do move them at night, you
21 understand that there is a requirement that there be
22 proper lighting and reflectors at the back of the baler?
A. Yes, I do.
23
Q. Because it's extremely dangerous, you
24
25 understand, to have a baler that size going that speed
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Q. Did he give you any instructions on the use
of the baler?
A.No.
Q. Did he tell you that there were any defects
in the baler?
A.No.
Q. Did he tell you the lights weren't working on
the baler?
A. No.
Q. Did he tell you the reflectors were not up to
date on the baler?
A. No.
MR. LLOYD: Objection. I'm just objecting to the
form of the question.
Go ahead and answer.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did he tell you that the
lights at the rear of the baler were not working?
A. No.
Q. You could see at the rear of this baler that
there were lights, correct?
A. There is lights on it, yes.
Q. But he didn't tell you that those lights
weren't working, correct?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did he give you any instructions on
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on a 50-mile-an-hour highway without proper lighting
behind it?
A. It needs proper lighting.
Q. Okay. It's fair to say when you borrowed
this baler from Mr. Robertson, you understood or
believed that it had proper lighting?
A. I didn't know what it had.
Q. Didyouaskhim?
A. No.
Q. Did he tell you?
A. No.
Q. Did he say to you, "Don't transport this at
night"?
A. No, he didn't.
Q. Did he say to you, "Always have a tail
vehicle when you transport this"?
A. No. I'd moved equipment before and we've
never used tail vehicles ever, during the day or
nothing.
Q. I understand your experience, but did he ask
you about what your experience was in moving equipment?
A. No.
Q. Did he ask you whether or not you ever used a
tail vehicle when you moved equipment?
A. No.
25 (Pages 100 to 103)
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Dustin M. #&a
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April 26,2005

out. Is it one parcel?
A. Parcel as --

2

Tiegs, et at. v. KuWa, er al.

A. Highway 45.

5
A. Like I say, one might be 300 feet, one might
6 be a half a mile. The Earthest-one I think was about a
7 mile, maybe, half a mile.
8
Q. Okay. So is it fair to say that ail these
9 fields that you were going to be baling extended over a
t 0 distance of about a mile?
11
A. Well, one way a mile. Then the other way
12 they farmed a lot of ground down Missouri. They farm
13 probably three or four miles down Missouri.
14
Q. And it was anticipated that you were going to
15 bale that property too?
16
A. Everything that Sbrolls had I was baling.
17
Q. Okay. And what's the speed limit on
18 Missouri?
19
A. It's 50 miles an hour.
20
Q. What's the terrain on Missouri?
21
A, It's not flat, but it's got a little dip to
22 it.
23
Q. And the speed limit on Highway 45 during this
24 one mile stretch is?
25
A. 65.

A. Aparcel as what?

10
Q. That's all I'm trying to find out.
I1
A. They're scattered all - they farm a lot of
12 ground. They're scattered. That's all f m i n g is, it's
14
Q. I understand. And that's all I want to know.
15
A. Okay.
Q, You say they farm a lot of ground. You're
16
17 talking about the Shrolls?
18
A. Yeah, Norm and Russ farm a lot of ground.
19
Q. So there is a 20-acre piece that they had,
20 approximately?
21
A. Yeah, probably had 20 acres.
22
Q, And it had straw on it?
23
A. Uh-huh.
24
Q. Is that a yes?
25
A. Yes.
Page 1 17

1
Q. And is that the field that you went to with
2 Mr. Robertson when he followed you in driving the baler?
3
A. Yes,
4
Q. Wow many of these fields were in straw at
5 that time?
6
A. They had eight, nine, ten fields of straw,
7 maybe 12.
8
Q. And Darrell knew that, correct?
9
A. Yeah, I think so.
10
Q. He could see that there -11
A. He could see all Shrolls' farm here. And
12 there is one there, one there, one there, one there.
13
Q. Did he know what fields were Shroll property,
14 were owned by the Shrolls?
A. He probably had a good idea. I don't know.
15
16
Q. But is it fair to say from your understanding
17 of your discussions with Mr. Robertson that he was aware
18 that you weren't going to be just baling one field?
19
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And in baling other fields, is it fair
20
21 to say that he understood that you would have to
22 transport the baler to another field?
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. And what road would you have had to use to
25 transport the baler in order to get from one field to
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Q. And how would you describe the terrain?
A. Terrain from where we started baling to where
the other field was?
Q. Yeah, the mile stretch.
A, It's not flat, but it's got a little dip like
this to it when you come into it. From the subdivision
to Missouri, it's got a little tiny -- it's not flat,
but -Q. When you say "from the subdivision," what are
you talking about?
A. Rolling Hills.
Q. And at the top of Missouri, is it fair to say
that that's kind of an apex of a hill, the top of a
hill?
A. I don't understand what an apex is.
Q. Top.
A. Yeah, it's kind of a little top.
Q. So there could be cars on the other side of
Missouri that probably can't see the bottom of this
valley, I think as you described it, or the lowest point
of this stretch after -- between the Missouri and the
subdivision?
A. The lowest point, I wasn't to the lowest
point yet.
Q. Just tell me if a car is located or your

29 (Pages 116 to 119)
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1
A. I'm not sure what was working and what
2 wasn't. I never really got out and really went through
3 things and looked at it. I never had to. This was a
4 good baler. It ran good and e v m i n g else, I just
5 broke a shear pin. I ran out of shear pins. Shear pins
6 are on the front of the tractor where the PTO hooks to
7 the tractor. I never got up and climbed on it or
8 nothing. I was going to run down and get a shear pin.
9
Q. Before the evening of July 30th, had you been
10 baling with that baler at night any other time?
11
A, Not at night, just until dusk.
13
A. Until I couldn't see any more, then I shut
14 the tractor off.
15
Q. So this was the first night that you had been
16 baling?
17
A. Right.
18
Q. And during that period of time at night on
19 July 30th, was there ever an occasion for you to have to
20 walk around behind the baler?
21
A. No.
22
Q. Was there ever an occasion at which you can
23 recall observing that the lights at the back of the
24 baler were not functioning?
25
A. I never had actually used it at night and had

1
2
3
4
5
6

8
9
10
11
12

there, and broke a shear pin. As I explained, the shear
pin is on the fly wheel. The PTQ comes out of the
tractor, comes up, and that's what rum the baler, makes
the guts of it work. There is a big fly wheel and it
has a deal on there that has a pin and it breaks it to
keep evewhing else from bre&g.
I'd already used my last one earlier. So I
broke another one, I just had this little bit left to go
in this field, and I just wanted to get done. And I
thought I could move down to another one and get some of
that done, you know. So I went, took the tractor out of
the field down the road to my pickup to go get a shear

14
15
16
17
I8
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Okay. What field were you farmkg before the
accident?
A, Shroll lives right on the corner of Missouri
and Highway 45.
Q. I'm going to give you a piece of paper, maybe
you can roughly draw out this piece of property in
relation to Highway 45.
A. Sure, 1'11 do that.
Here's Highway 45. Here's the house, the
field lays like this. Here's where I come out on the
road, down the road.
Q. Okay. So this would be south?
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actually crawled around it and seen if it works.
Because all the lighting on it would have been in the
back of it. There is nothing in the front to indicate
to me that there is any lights or anything going.
Q, That's fine, I understand that. So I guess
if you can just try to give me a yes or no.
Do you recall as you sit here today prior to
the accident ever recognizing that the lights were not
h c t i o n i n g on the back of the baler?
A. No, sir.
Q. Okay. And there was no occasion for you to
go around behind the baler to actually see whether or
not those lights were functioning, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You knew the baler had lights -A, Yes.
Q. There was no occasion for you to look to see
if they were working?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me what happened at the time that caused
you to stop baling and transport the baler onto Highway
45.
A. I had used my last shear pin, put it in

Tiegs, et al. v. Kukla, et al.
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A. Uh-huh.
Q. This would be north?
A. Yes.
Q. East, west.
A.Yes.
Q. Okay. And this is the field that you were
baling?
A. Yes.
Q. And we'll call that -- I'll just put a " 1" in
the middle of that.
That's the field you were baling?
A. Yes.
Q. How many acres is that?
A. I think it's like five acres. Maybe, five,
six, seven acres.
Q. All of it was straw?
A. Yes.
Q. And how much of that five to seven acres had
you baled?
A. Almost all the long rows I had left there to
do.
Q. Okay. And where was your pickup located?
A. Down here.
Q. Where?
A. There's another field down here that my

.
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J. Nick Crawford, ISB No. 3220
John h4.Howell, TSB No. 6234
BMSSEU, WETHEELL, GRAWFOm & GARRETT
203 W. Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 8370 1- 1009
Telephone: (208) 344-7300
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077
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Attorneys for Defendant Mike Kukla

IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE THIRI) JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

BRUCE TIEGS, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIEGS; and
SUSAN W T E R , individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; and K.P. Infnc.,an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV 04-400 1

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PmJUDICE

1

DUSTIN M. KIKLA; DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON; and MICHAEL D.
KUIUA
Defendants.

I

The Stipulation filed contemporaneously herein between the Plaintiffs and Defendant
Michael D. Kukla, having been presented to the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises;

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE - 1

000394

1T IS HEREBY OmERED, ADJUDGED AND DECWED that P l a i n t i f f s k e n d e d

Complaint against Defendant Michael D. Kukla on file herein be, and the same hereby is, dismissed
with prejudice, each party to bear his or her awn costs asxi attorney fees.

DATED t16s

day of

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREPJDICE - 2

000395

CLEW" SGERTIFIGATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of March, 2006, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE upon each of the following
individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
ROSSMAN, LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Terrence R. White
WHITE PETERSON
5700 East Fra~lklinRd., Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Rodney R. S a e t m
David W. Lloyd
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite1800
Boise, Idaho 83702-5958

J. Nick Grawford
John M. Howell
Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett
203 West Main Street
P.O. Box 1009
Boise, Idaho 83701-2009

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE - 3

1U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 342-2170

2 U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid
Eland-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 466-4405
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

- Wand-Delivered

Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 336-0448

_Ih U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Wand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 344-7077

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUW

Erie S. Rossmm, ISB #4573
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
R O S S M LAW GROW, PLLC
737 N. Yth Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 33 1-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2 170
Terrence R. White, ISB # 135 1
W T E PETERSON
5700 East Franklin Rd, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone: (208) 466-9272
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF I D M O , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
BRUCE TEGS, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIEGS; and
SUSAN HJTER, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; and K. P. Inc., an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

1
)
)

CASE NO. CV 04-4001
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SY
JUDGmNT

1
)
)

1
VS.

DUSTIN M. KUKLA, DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON; and MICHAEL D.
K WA,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

1
1
)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGrnNT 1

-

Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion for S

m

q Judgment came on regularly

for hearing before this Court on March 8,2006. The Plaintiffs were present by and through their
counsel of record, Eric S. Rossman of Rossman Law Group, PLLC, and the Defendant Darrell
Robertson was present by and through his counsel of record, David W. Lloyd of Saetrum Law
Offices. AAer hearing arguments of counsel, and reviewing the documents and pleadings of
record, IT IS JXEmBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Darrell
Robertson's Motion for S m q Judgment is hereby DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
DATED this

day of

MP"

I ?'GO6

District Judge

,2006.

V

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 2

PAGE

Eric S. Rossmm, ISB H573

Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331 -2030
Facs~Ie?: (208) 342-22 70

Attomqs for Plaintiffs

W THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JURICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W OF CANYON
personal rqkesenta~veof the Estate of

DUSTIN M. KUKLA, and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,

1
)

1
)

Defendants.

1
1

MEMOICANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR S m n L R Y SUZIGkfZNT 1

-
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, ROSSMAN
LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell
Robe~son'sMotion for Sumaxy Judgment.

aud negligent entrustmat on behalf of Dmell Robatson. On July 29,2005, PlainPiffs filed a
motion for leave to amend to add Michael Kukla as a defendant in this matter. Following oral
argument md a hearing, th
2006, Defendant Darsetl Robwson filed a motion for su

no evidehce

to

support

entmsmmt, md imputed 1
argument on the motion,thc

Def'daat has now
Plaintiffs' claims. Defendant has raised na new issues, but rather reasserts the same arguments

made in the earlier motion for summary judgment previously denied by the Court. Wbile
Plaintiffs recognize that without a fmal judgment, the decision denying summary judgment

remains intalocutory and can be reconsidered by the Court, Plaintiffs would remind the Court
M E M O R W U M IN OPPOSITION TO DEmN]DANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMGRY ;IUDGMIENT 2

-
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that Defmdant raised thcsc same issues prior to trial in this matter aod the Court denied

Defendant's motian and aljowed Plaintiffs to proced to trial on these claims. But for the
mistrial declared by the COUI?,Defendant would not have had the opportunity to bring this same
motion yet again. Nw&elcss, for the reasons set forth below, PlaintifFsrespecthlly assert that

there are genuine issues o f material fact remaining for trial in this matter and, as such,

Defendant's motion must be denied.

Falh Highway Disf..135 Idaho 322,325,17 P.3d 266,269 (2000). When considering a motion
for summaryjudgment, "a court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion and draws all. reasonable iderenc

favor." Id Applying the applicable standard ofreview to the r
i s not appropriate as the

against Defendant Darre

2.

As he did in the fnst motion fur sumwjudgment, Robertson argues that he is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for negligent entrustment because Plaintiffs

cannot establish that Robertson knew or should have known that Kukla was an incapacitated or

MEM0RANI)UM EN OPPOSI'I'XON TO DEFENDANT IlrlliRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 3

-
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incompetent person who would use the tranor and baler in a mamer that would create an

unreasonable risk of harm to ot&ers. Howwer, as he has done previously, Robertson misstates

the staodard for a negligent enhustment claim in Idaho, as well as the facts tspporting Plaintiffs'
claim.

In Ransom v. Cify of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1 987), the

the thing or to canduct himself in the activity in such a ma=
to create an unrwonable risk of harm to others,

as

Set? id.(mphasis added).

This is the definitio

Supreme Court. Nothing

"The dutv to take mecautions aaainst the neglinence of others thus
involves merely the usual.process of multiplvinn the ~robab&
that such nenli~encewill occur bv the magnitude of the harm likely
to resuft if it does, and weiahina the result against the burden ugon
the defendant o f exercisina: such care, The duty arises, in other
words, only w h m a reasonable person would recognize the
existence of an unreasonabIe risk of harm to others through the
mMORAM,UM IN DPPOS.ITIONTO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
POR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 4

-

85/28

intmentioa of such negligmce. It becomes most obvious wben
the acwr bas reurn to h o u r that he: i s dealing with pemm whase
chwacteristics make it especially likely that they will do
umeasombte things. The actor may be required to guard an insane
patimt to pmvent him h m jumping &om the hospital window, or
to refrain b r n gulting an intoxicated person off of a train into a
railroad yard, or letting him have an automobile, or more liquor."
See Ransom, 113 Idaho at 206-207,743 P.2d at 75-76 ( q u o ~ Presser
g
and Keeton, The Law of

Torts $33, at 199 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added). The Court then concluded that "[wJhe

As is set forth cleady above, the Court did not adopt the tort of negligent

enttustment only in the specific cases of an incompetent or incapacitated petson. Rather, the

Court adopted the tort and specifiedthe duty arising korn the right ta control a vehicle- that the
owner exercise reasonable care and not

knows, or should foreseeably kno
0tht;rs.
Thig definition of n
v. Langer, I 14 IW5 873,761, P.

entrushnenl as "falnowner or other pmon in control of a vehi.cl.eaxld respoasible for its use may

be beld liable for damages resulting &om use of the vehicle by another under the theory of
negligent entrustment, where such person h a v or should have known that such use may cratc

an unreasonable risk of ham to others.': See id. at 875,76t P,2d at 1227.
mMORGNI)UM IN OPPOSIXTON TO IDEENIIANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION

FORY
-S

-

JUJKMENT 5

PAGE

Robertson insists that proving that he h e w that Dustin Kukla was an incompetent

or incapacitatal person is necessary to proving a claim o f negligent entiustment. However,
Robaison can cite to no Idaho case law in which the Court has expressly identified that aspect as
an actual element of a negligent entrustment case. Rather, each case in which the Court
discussed this element of the tort of negligent mtmsment actually involved a person who was

intoxicated or othrtnvise incornpet

has recognized the general duty to not permit another person to we a vehicle where such pason
knew or should have known that such use may create an mwooabk risk of harm to others. See

uw68sonablc ris

tractor and baler, Further, Robertson
baler in a manner which created an umeasonable n'sk of harm to others. Thus, the only issue
raised by Robertson in regard to the claim for negligent entntstwr.ent, as defined by the Idaho

Supreme Court,is whether Robertson knew or should have known that Dustin was likely to use

the tractor and baler in a m m e r which created aa unreasonable risk of h a m to Kemeth Tiegs.
m M O W U M .INOPPOSITION TO DEmNIDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SUNiMARY SUDGFdENT 6
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The Idaho

COU&
h~ held that foreseeability is generally a question for

the jury. Aie@ia v. Payor&, 101 Idaho 617, 619,619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). In his depositioR
Robeltson testified that he never informed Dustin &Ha that the lights on the baler did not work.
See Deposition of Darrell Robertson ("Robertson Rqo."), p. 52, line 25 -p. 53,line 8, attached
as E a b i t "A" to the m d a v i t of David W. Lloyd. Robertson also testified that be knew that

mtom and balers were t

line 1. Dustin Kukla testified that he wss not aware that the lights were not working on the

tractor and balm. See Deposition ofDustin KuWa ("Kukla Depo."), p. 124, line 18-p. 125, line
21, attached ss Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of David W. Lloyd. Dustin also testified that

Robertson neva told him

understanding that the tractor and baler would be used only for the purpose of baling straw on

the Schroll property. However, Robertson testified that he h e w that tractors and balers am
moved at night with proper lighting. See Robertson Depo.,p. 53, LL 9-12. Further, Robertson

testified that he knew that baling activities were typically performed in the evening hours after
MEMORANDUM W UPPOSlTION TO DEFlENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTTON
FOR SuMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
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sunset. See Robertson Depo., p. 38, line 25 - p. 39, line 6. Dustin Kukla testified that Robertson
h e w that the Scholl property included several different parcels and that Robenson was aware

that Dustin would have to transport the tractor and baler from one parcel to another io the course
of his baling activities. See Kukla Depo., p. 117, LL 16-23. Kukla also testified th& the road

used to transport the tractor and baler from one field to aoothm was Highway 45. See Kukla

line 23 - p. 66, line 3. Robertson testified that it was at least 10:00 or 11:00 at night and pitch
black and that Dustin was baling straw at that time. See Robertson Dcpo., p. 66, tL 4-24.

knowledge of Kukla's history, dri
LL 9-21. Rather, Robertson simply assumed Dustin was a good f m e i because his fatha was.
See Robertson Depo., p. 16, line 22 - p. 17, line 3. Robertson also testified that he observed

Kukl,af d n g property between April an? July of 2003 and that his opinion of Kukla's f&g
practices changed because the property didn't look good. See Robertson Depo., p. 18, line 19
MEMOIMNDW IN OlPPOSlTXON TO DEFErU'DANTDARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTIOJY
Xi'OR SIIMIWARY JtJDGMBHT - 8

-
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p. 19, line 13. Finally, Robatson testified that he did not know Kukla's farming practices at the

time he loaned the tractor and baler to Kukla and made no inquiries regarding his habits and
practices in transyoning farm quipmmt prior to loaning the tractor and baler to Kukla. See

-

Robertson Dcpo., p. 53, line 20 p. 5 4 l i n ~1.

Based on the evidence provided in this case, tbere are issues of fact regarding

whether Robertson knew or should have h o r n that Dustin was likely to use the tractor and bala
in a manner which.
know1edge of balin

property consisted of several notl-contiguous pa
Robertson should have known that Dustin would operate the tractor and baler at night and that
the tractor and baler would be moved on a public road. Further, Roboltson specifically knew fhat
Dustin was baling the property at night because he had personally observed that activity the day

prior to the accident. Because Rob

Dustin to borrow the

Based on his own testimony, Robertson bad actual knowledge that Dustin was
operating the traaor and baler on the Scholl property at night. Given this information, as well as

his knowledge about the non-contiguous parcels, the fact that he knew the lights did not work,

and that operating the tractor and baler on Highway 45 at night would create ao umasonable
mM0-m
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risk of danger to others, Robertson certainly should have at least inquired as to Dustin's practices

regarding transporting tractor and balm at night and, therefore, most certainly should have

reasonably known that there was a likelihood that Dustin would transport the tractor and baler
from one field to anotl~nat night. As such, thae are genuine issues of fact remaining for trial on
Plaintiffs' claim for negligent enttustrnent and Robertson's motion must be denied.
2

nere are Genuine issut~sof Fact Remaining Regarding Plointtjlf"g'
Claim for
P Sa,

this argument, Robertson asserts that there is no evidence that he caused or knowingly permitted

Dustin to operate the tractor and bailer on a public roadway at night without working tail lights

because the tractor and bailer were loaned to Dustin and transported to the Scholl property
during tht: day and that i

argues that Idaho Code

of a vehicle in violation o
this case d~monstrateth

condition in violation of Idaho Code $4 49-902(1) and 49-91 6.
Idaho Code @49-9 16 requires that tractors and towed implements of husbandry
which are operated on fbe public roads between sunset and sunrise have working 1igh.t~andlor

reflectors visible from a distance of at least 500 fcet. See id. In this case, it is undisputed that

MEMO-W
FORY
-S
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Robertson's tractor and baler did not comply with the requirements of Idaho Code $$49-916.
Further, it is undisputed that Robertson knew, at the time be loaned the tractor and balcr to

Dustin Kulda, that the lighting system on the tractor and baler did not work. See Robertson
Depo,, p. 50, LL 8-23.
Robeason furthertmtified that while he knew that the Idaho law required li&&g

borrowed the &tor and baler despite the fact that he had no kaa
about, Dustin's farrtxlia

that Dustin would be &ansportingthe baler at night. However, Robertson testified that tractors

and balm are moved at night with proper lighting. See Robertson Depo., p. 53, LL 9-12.
Further, Robet~sontestified that he h e w that baling activities were typically performed in the
evening hours after sunset. See Robertson Depo., p. 38, line 25 - p. 39, line 6. Dustin Kukla

mMORAM)UM XN OPPOSWJON TO DEXENDGNT D-LL

-
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ROBERTSON'S MOTION
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testified that Robwson knew that the Scholl property in~ludedseveral different parcels and that

Robertson was aware that Dustin would have to transport the tractor and baler from one parcel to
mother in the course of his baling activities. See KuMa Depo., p. 117, LL 16-23 Kukla also
testified that the road used to transport the tractor and balm from one field to aothcr was

-

Highway 45. See Kukla Depo., p. 117, line 24 p. 1 18, line 2. Further,Dustin Kukla testified

l1:W at night and pitch black and that Dustin was baling straw at tbat time. See Robertson
Dtpo., p. 66, LL 4-24.

on a public Irlgbway. Further, Ro

howledge, Robertson never informedKukla that the taillights on the baler did not work, nor did

he condition his lending of the baler on any assurance from Dustin that it would not be operated
on the public highways after sunset. Under such circumstances ajury could reasonably findthat

Robntson did knowingly p m i t Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on the public highway
MEMO-UM
FORY-S

IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT D U L L ROBERTSON'S MOTION
JUDGBBNT - 12

PAGE

after sunset in an unsafe condition.

A s h p l y hypothetical demonskata the reasonablenas of such a detsmination.
Suppose A allows B to borrow A's car. A h w s that the headlights are not in working order. A
also knows that B is borrowing the car to go to work. A fkther knows that B sometimes stays at
work until &r dark. A never tells B that the headlights are not working. B botrows the car,

works late one night and then finds that the headlights don'

working headlights and never told B tbat hc could not operate the vehicle aRor dark because of

the broken headlights. This case is no different. Robertson knew that the lights on the tractor
and baler did not work and never iofomed Dustitx of that fact, d

baling activities generally occtrned aad the fact that the baler wou
public highway to reach the different parcels on the Scholl

on Plainti@' claim for ne

Robertson. The claim was asserted in Count One of Plaintiffs' Complaint and is included within
the claim for negligence per se. Even assuming that Plaintigs cannot estabIish that Idaho Code

$5 49-902(1) and 49-916 provide a legal duty which was breached by Robatson, Plaintiffs can
still demonstrate that a legal duty exi.sts in this case aside from the statutory duty, that such duty
NEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 3'0 DEFEMDANT DARFtELI, ROBERTSON'S MOTION
JUDGMENT - 13

FOR Y
S
-
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was breached by Robertson, and that such a breach was a pmximate cause of the death of

Kemeth Tiegs. In fact, despite the Couxtysearlier ruling on s m a r yjudgment, as well as the

Court's decision allowing Plaintiffs to proceed against Robenson on a claim for negligence,

Robettson has not even attempted to arguethat he is eatitled to s u m a t y j u d p e n t on Plaintifi'
claim for negligence. As such, even if the Court were to grant RobMson's motion with regards
to &a claims tbr nttgfigent enlt-ustrn

Under Idaho law, in order to establish a claim for negligence a Plaintiff must
demonstrate (I) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to coofirm to a certain

(emphasis omitted), quoting Kirby v. SonviNe, 286 Or. 339,594P.2d 8 18,821 (1 979); Ranrum v.

Ci&

of

Garden Czp, 113 ldaho 202,208,743 P.2d 70,76 (1987) (holding that the ofEcer owed

the same general duty to theplainhffthat applied to all members o f sociw). In this case, the fact
that there is an express statute requiring owners and operators of tractors and farm implements to
M E M O W U M n?J OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY SU1DGMIEW 14
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have working tail lights when those implwents are transporfed on the public road after dark further
mpp& the existence o f Robatson's duty in his rnattm. As nuch thcre is no question that

Robertson had a duty to use reasonable can to prevetlt hami ta othen by m d g that the tractor and

baler had working lights in any case where it was foreseeable that the tractor and baler would bc
driven an apublicroad at night. As was discussed above, in this w e it was mtirely foreseeable that

Dustin Kukla would be opmating the tractor and baler at night and that the tractor and bdm would be

above evidence demonstrates that Robertson loaned a tractor and baler to Dustin Kukfa w h i ~ h

did not have working tail lights. The evidence further demonstrates that Robertson h e w Ihetail

lights did not work and took no steps to ensure that Dustin Kukla was aware of the non-working

lights or that Dustin Kukla would not be &a
testimony cited above also demonstrates that

one parcel to another, and that moving the tractor snd baler would require
public roads. Thus, a jury could certainly fmd that it was foreseeable to Robertson that Kukla

would transport thc baler on the public road and that such transport might occur at night.
Despite of the likelihood that the tractor and baler would be used at night without working tail

lights, Robertson nevertheless allowed Dustin Kukla to borrow the tractor and balm without
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR S-Y
JUDGMlENT 15
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informing him o f the non-working lights and without taking any stcps to inquire about Dustin's
fmirrg c x w e a ~ or
e practices.
The evidencein this case danonstratesthat Robertson breached his duty by &owing

Dustin Kukla to borrow the tractor and balm without (1) informing Dustin that the tail lights did not

any steps to inquire about Dustin's exprrience io handling farm equipment or his

lights, Robatson's lack ofknowledge regarding Kukla's farming practices,and the foreseeability o f
the tractor and baler being used at night, Dustin Kukla would not have been driving the tractor and

Finally, Robertson argues that he i s entitled to suwnaryjudgment on Plaintiffs'

claim for imputed liability because the tractor and baler are "implments of husbandry"under the
provisions of the Idaho Motor Vehicle Act and the imputed liabiliestahite only applies to motor

vehicles- Idaho Code 9 49-2417 provides that "evny owner of a motor vehicle is liable and
MEMORANDm IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR S-Y
JUDGMENT 16

-
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responsible for the death o f or injury to a person or property resulting b r n negligence in the
operation of his motor vehicle . . . by any pesson using or operating the vchicle with the
permission, express or implied o f the owner, and the negligence ofthoperson shall be imputed to
the owner fm all purposes of civil damages." See I.C. $49-2417.Idaho Code @ 49-123(2)(g)

defines "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is

Ule tractor driven by Dustin Kukla and owned by DarreJl Robertson is clearly a motor vehicle

because it is a "self-propelled"' vehicle. The definition of motor vehicle d

exclude ''bp1ernea.t~of husband

qualify as an "impiment of husbandry" but an implement of husbandry can be a "motor

vehicle." Such a conclusion is supported by other provisions of the act such as Idaho Code tj 49902 which provides that it is unlawfbl for vehicles to be opcrated in an unsafe condition and

without proper equipment, but specifically excludes farm tractors and implements of husbandry
M I E M O W U M IN OPIPOS~IONTO DEEENDANT DARRFJLL ROBERTSON'S MO'lTOi%
BOR SW A R Y mGW,W 17

-

18/20

PAGE

to

to the extent

spwificallyreferaced in certain provisions. See 1.c. 4- 8. 49-902

and 49-91 6.

merefore,baause an implement of h u s b a n e falls within the plain d e f ~ t i o nofa
motor vehicle within the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act, Idaho Code $49-123(2)(g) and Idaho Code
$ 2417 imputes liability to the o

m of motor vehicles for iojurirr auscdby the negligent acts

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs r e s p e c ~ i l yrequest that Darmll
Robemon's Motioa for Summary Judgmont be DENIED.
JhU'ED this

7 ?day of December, 2007.
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

SUSAN HUTER, individually as copersonal representative o f the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs, and K.P. Inc., an Idaho
corporation,,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. CV-2004-4001
NO. CV-2005-7739

VS.

DUSTIN M. KUKLA and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,
Defendants.
KENNETH TlEGS and SONS, INC., as
subrogee of UNIGARD INSURANCE,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DUSTIN M. KUKLA and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,
Defendants.
This is a civil matter. On January 3, 2008, Defendant Darrell Robertson's motion
for summary judgment came before the court on oral argument. Mr. David Lloyd
represented Mr. Robertson, while Mr. Eric Rossman represented the plaintiffs. For the
reasons set out below, the court denies the motion for summary judgment.
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I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
This matter possesses a long procedural history, going back to the original filing
of the complaint on 26 April 2004. Because Defendant Robertson brings this summary
judgment motion, the court states the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the court borrows extensively from plaintiffs' brief recitation of the facts,
that is, of which there exists no dispute. The matter before the court arises out of a
collision between a vehicle driven by Kenneth Tiegs and a tractor pulling a baler driven
by Defendant Dustin Kukla, but owned by another, Defendant Darrell Robertson. The
collision occurred on 30 July 2003 and resulted in Kenneth Tiegs' death. Defendant
Robertson sets out a more detailed statement of undisputed material facts in his
December 7, 2007, Memorandum supporting his motion for summary judgment, to
which the plaintiffs have not objected.
In what was then denominated as CV 2005-7739, Tiegs, et al., filed an action as
subrogees of Unigard Insurance against Kukla and Robertson. On 28 November 2005,
Judge Hoff granted the motion to consolidate both matters. Prior to that consolidation,
the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on 22 September 2005 in CV 2004-4001.
Since Judge Hoff consolidated both actions against the defendants subsequent to the
first amendment, plaintiffs' amended complaint in CV 2004-4001 does not mention the
subrogation action. Nevertheless, since Judge Hoff consolidated both matters under
CV 2004-4001, the first amended complaint need not mention the subrogation action.
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Noteworthy, however, concerns the fact that Defendant Robertson previously
sought summary judgment, heard and decided by Judge Hoff before the Trial Court
Administrator assigned the consolidated matters to this court. On 8 March 2006, Judge
Hoff entered an order summarily denying the Robertson motion.

In entering the

judgment against Defendant Robertson, Judge Hoff did not set forth any reasons for her
decision, either in fact or law.
After re-assignment and following pretrial and status conferences before this
court, the parties began their trial of the issues on 25 September 2007. However, rightly
or wrongly, based upon

ts made to the jury durin

e

of the attorneys for Defendant Robertson, this court granted the plaintiffs' oral motion for
mistrial. Hence, because Judge Hoff had not stated her reasons for denying Defendant
Robertson's earlier motion for summary judgment, and because this court has some
questions covering the basis for denial if made on the law, this court informed both
sides that it would entertain further motions on summary judgment, even if covering the
same issues argued before Judge Hoff. The court understands counsel for plaintiffs'
mild complaint: "But for the mistrial declared by the Court, Defendant would not have
had the opportunity to bring this same motion yet again."'
Defendant Robertson filed his second go-round on 7 December 2007, and, as
noted, the court heard oral argument on 3 January 2008. In his motion, Defendant
Robertson asks this court to grant summary judgment in his favor on the claims of
negligent entrustment, negligence per se, and imputed liability. For the reasons set out
1

Counsel for plaintiffs, of course, made the motion for mistrial, perhaps underscoring the time-honored
admonition: Be careful what you ask for.
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below, the court denies summary judgment in favor the Defendant Robertson on the
issues of negligence per se, imputed liability and negligent entrustment.

ANALYSIS
A.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN GENERAL

Most ldaho trial lawyers know the summary judgment mantra by heart: Summary
judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on
file show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Hayes v, Unio

aho

204, 207, 141 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2006); Northwest Bee-Cop v. Home Living Sew., 136
ldaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002); City of ldaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co.,
126 ldaho 604, 606, 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995). Through the summary judgment
technique, then, trial courts view all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the
non-moving party. Read v. Harvey, 141 ldaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005),
reh'g denied. This means the moving party has the burden of proving the absence of
genuine issue of material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Orthman v. ldaho Power, 130 ldaho 597,
600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). See also, G&M Farms v. Funk Imgation Co., 119
ldaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991).
Nevertheless, while the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences
contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion, still, to
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must anchor its case
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in something beyond speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence does not create a
genuine issue. Samuel v. Hepworfh, Nungester, & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 ldaho 84, 87, 966
P.2d 303, 306 (2000); Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 ldaho 851, 853,727 P.2d 1279,
1281 (Ct. App. 1986).

Accordingly, the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment may not simply rest on allegations contained in the pleadings; rather, the nonmoving party must produce evidence by way of affidavit or deposition in order to
contradict the assertions of the moving party. Ambrose v. Buhl School Dist. #12, 126
ldaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994). "Bare assertions that an issue
of fact exists, in the face of particular facts alleged by a movant, are not s
create a genuine issue of fact." Cates

V.

o

Albertson's Inc., 126 ldaho 1030, 1033, 895

P.2d 1223, 1226 (1995); Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 ldaho 270,
274, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1994). In other words, the nonmovant's response "must set
forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
Having laid the foundation for the no-genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard, the
existence of disputed facts, ironically, will still not defeat summary judgment in favor of
the defendant if the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to plaintiffs case, and on which plaintiff bears the burden of
proof at trial. Ganee v. Barkley, 121 ldaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App.
1992). Accordingly, facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when plaintiffs fail to
establish a prima facie case. In such cases, there can be "no genuine issue of material
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Id., citing
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Celotex Corp. v. Catfee, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). Based upon these fundamental
standards, the court now considers Defendant Robertson's motion for summary
judgment.

B.

NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT IN IDAHO COMPRISES AN EVOLVING
CONCEPT

Negligent entrustment exists in ldaho if for no other reason because it comprises
"nothing more than a particularized application of the general tort principles contained in
the concept of negligence." Olguin v. City of Burley, 119 ldaho 721,
258 (199 I), reh'g denied, citing Ransom v. City of Garden City, 11
743 P.2d 70, 74-76 (1987). As a species of tort, however, negligent entrustment
appears to pop up first in Kinney v. Smith, 95 ldaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234 (1973). While
lawyers and judges often hear that bad facts make bad law, Kinney v. Smith, supra,
may stand for the proposition that peculiar facts require everyone to wait and see what
the law really means.

In Kinney, it seems the court and defendant's attorney

understood the parties would try the case on damages, not liability. That, apparently,
did not comport with the understanding of plaintiffs attorney. Nevertheless, the trial
court sustained objections to the attempted admission of evidence offered to show the
direct (as opposed to imputed) negligence of the person who loaned a car to an
unlicensed driver. This resulted in the trial court never allowing the issue of "negligent
entrustment" to go to the jury for its determination. Frankly, reading the opinion in its
totality, particularly the quoted portions of the trial transcript, it leaves one with the
abiding impression that the trial court seemed confused over what the parties intended
for submission to the on their "stipulation" regarding liability. Accordingly, a unanimous
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
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court reversed the matter, sending it back to the trial court with the following
instructions:
If, upon remand, the [car loaner] is found to have ne~lictentlv
entrusted her vehicle to [the unlicensed driver], then
judgment should be re-entered upon the jury verdict
previously rendered. But if the [car loaner] is exonerated of
such independent negligence, then the judgment finally
entered should reflect a reduction of the jury verdict, so that
the amount recovered from the [car loaner] does not exceed
the limitations set forth in I.C. § 49-1404.
95 ldaho at 334, 508 P.2d at 1240 (emphasis added).
This brings us next to the oft-cited non-negligent entrustment case of Alegria v.
Payonk, 101 ldaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), reh'g denied.

This case allows us to

discover what our Supreme Court considered at least some of the elements making up
negligent entrustment. Ironically, Alegria v. Payonk, supra, a 3-2 decision (but with
different personalities in the majority than the 3-2 decision it overruled) dealt with the
thorny issue of the sale of alcohol to an apparently and obviously intoxicated minor as a
contributing and actual cause of damage to a third party resulting from the made-evenmore-intoxicated minor's subsequent and negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
Alegria overruled Meade v. Freeman, 93 ldaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969). Meade, of
course, comprised the first (and apparently last) case in ldaho to recognize the lack of a
cause of action in negligence at common law for serving obviously intoxicated
individuals who later cause injury or death due to their intoxication while later operating
a motor vehicle. Prior to Alegria, Justice Shepard, writing for the majority in Meade v.
Freeman, supra, had this to say:
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[Plaintiff's] theory [of liability against the bar owner for
serving an obviously drunk person] runs squarely in the face
of almost ail authority. It is nearly universally held [internal
citations omitted] that it is the consumption of intoxicants that
constitutes the proximate cause of damage to third parties
resulting from the tortuous or unlawful acts of the consumer
and that the vending of intoxicants is too remote to be
considered a proximate cause. Put another way, the
common law holds that it is not actionable negligence to
serve intoxicants to an able bodied man [sic].
93 ldaho at 392,462 P.2d at 57.*
So what does Alegria have to do with negligent entrustment in overruling Meade?
Nothing, really, other than noting the Kinney decision and then ex

upon it in

dicta by stating, "The 'negligent entrustment' tort approved in Kinney is a recognition of

the risk of injury which exists when two ingredients are combined; the automobile and
an incompetent or incapacitated driver." 101 ldaho at 620, 619 P.2d at 138 (emphasis
added). Therefore, in Alegria, we see the baseline of what our high Court had in mind
in negligent entrustment of automobile cases (that is, within the context of a
particularized application of general tort principles): an incompetent driver or an

Alegda simply applied general tort principles to the inverse of loaning a car to an

obviously intoxicated driver, that is, giving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated driver who

*

The comment by Justice Shepard for a 3-2 majority about serving alcohol to an "able bodied man"
seems disingenuous. An individual served alcohol while in an obviously intoxicated state, and who later
causes the death of another human being due to an incapacity caused by the intoxication, could hardly be
considered "able bodied." Such person might have started out "able bodied," yet, after so many drinks, it
is beyond cavil that one's ability to think, reason, and act in a rational and normal way becomes greatly
diminished. The Court seems to have specifically recognized this fact in n.1 of Alegda in 95 ldaho at 620,
619 P.2d at 138, much to Justice Shepard's constemation, as evidenced in his dissent in Alegria.
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could reasonable be expected to get into a vehicle and drive some more.' It held that
when a bar sells more alcohol to an obviously intoxicated driver, well knowing there
exists a likelihood ( A M forseeability) the intoxicated driver will get behind the wheel of
a motor vehicle before he or she becomes sober, such conduct exposes the bar owner
to liability for any death or damage caused by the driver, especially when the intoxicated
driver is a minor. As the majority put it, "We perceive no justification for excusing the
licensed vendor of intoxicants from the above [common law] general duty which each
person owes all others in our society." 101 ldaho at 619, 619 P.2d at 137. Clearly, the
context within which the trier of fact makes the determinati

bar owner

breached a duty to the public sounds in common law, garden-variety tort-not

some

fancy particularized application of tort principles.
We come now to the question whether the jury in the
present case should have been allowed to determine
whether [the bar owners] engaged in the daily business of
selling intoxicants for consumption on their premises, could
reasonably have foreseen or anticipated that their sale of
intoxicants to Payonk, whom they knew or should have
known to be a minor and whom they knew or should have
known to be actually, apparently and obviously intoxicated,
might result in injury to appellants; and whether the conduct
of [the bar owners] in so acting fell below that of the person
of ordinary prudence acting under the same circumstances
and conditions.

Id.

Perhaps one can argue that Alegria speaks to a kind of "negligent entrustment. of alcohol to an already
intoxicated minor. Frankly, that seems illogical. Even a casual reading of the decision points to the
application of general tort principles that hundreds of ldaho Law School graduates learned from none
other than Professor George Bell, now of blessed memory. Professor Bell's training has empowered
these practitioners (and jurists) to recognize general tort principles when they see them.
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1. A Horse Is a Worst?, of Coursq of Course, unless Its Name fs Foreseeability
A major, though hardly surprising, disagreement between the plaintiffs and
Defendant Robertson centers on the nature of forseeability within the context of
negligent entrustment. Although both common law tort and negligent entrustment use
the term foreseeability, the question becomes whether it has the same import in both
instances. Recent ldaho decisions have grappled with the definition of foreseeability,
linking it to the concept of proximate cause.

&'-

In Hayes v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, the ldaho Supreme Court, among other
things, held that a train operator's failure to blow specific emergency

ns

prior to the train colliding with a motor vehicle (killing the driver) did not provide a basis
of recovery for the survivors. The Court further ruled that the fact the train exceeded its
speed limit at a point twelve minutes prior to reaching the crossing and at another point
thirty-eight miles from the crossing did not amount to the proximate cause of the
accident as a matter of law. The plaintiffs had argued the railroad company was
negligent because its train exceeded its specially imposed limit for the type of cargo it
pulled (e.g., "but for" the increased speed, the train would not have been at the crossing
when the local resident in his truck attempted to cross). In response to this argument,
Justice Trout wrote for the unanimous majority.
This argument ignores the foreseeability element of
proximate cause. "Proximate cause consists of two factors,
cause in fact and legal responsibility." Marias v. Marano,
120 ldaho 11, 813 P.2d 350 (1991); See Doe I v. Sisters of
Holy Cross, 126 ldaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995)
[where the plaintiffs appealed the decision of the trial court
on a summary judgment motion]. The "legal responsibility
element of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
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the defendant's negligent act the Appellant's injury was
reasonably foreseeable as a natural or probable
consequence of the defendant's conduct." Doe, 126 ldaho at
1041, 895 P.2d at 1234. "Only when reasonable minds
could come to but one conclusion as to whether the
Appellant's injury was reasonably foreseeable may the judge
decide this legal responsibility as a matter of law." Id.
143 Idaho at 208, 141 P.3d at 1077(bracketed material added for context).
Justice Trout further noted,
It is not reasonablv foreseeable that slight increases
(or decreases, for that matter) in speed either twelve minutes
or thirty-eight miles prior to the accident would result in the
train arriving at the crossing at the exact time that Hayes'
truck was on the tracks and thus cause an accident. The
same argument could be made that had the train never left
that day, the accident would not have been caused. Thus,
as a matter of law, UPR's conduct was not the proximate
cause of the accident and we affirm the district court's
decision dismissing the excessive speed claim.
Id (emphasis added).

Justice Bistline, in an earlier decision, dealt with foreseeability where an intruder
into an office building raped a female worker there.

After a rehearing, the Court

reversed the trial court's summary judgment that ruled against the worker-victim in her
suit against the building owner, the security contractor, and the security service for
failing to check all doors in the building where she worked. Justice Bistline noted,
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which [sic] varies
with the circumstances of each case. Where the degree of
result or harm is crreat, but preventing it is not difficult, a
relativelv low degree of foreseeabilitv is required.
Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of
foreseeability may be required. [Citations omitted.] Thus,
foreseeabilitv is not to be measured by iust what is more
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
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reasonable conduct. [Citations omitted.]
Sharp v. W. H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300-01, 796 P.2d 506, 509-10
(1990)(emphasis added).
J

In Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, supra, relied upon by our Supreme Court in
the Hayes train-crossing decision, a minor and his parent brought an action against St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for sexual abuse suffered by the minor at the hands
of a former employee of the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the hospital, finding the hospital had fired the employee before the molestation,
hence, not proximately caused by the hospital (too remote in time).

The Court of

Appeals disagreed with the trial court's analysis. First, the boy had met the perpetrator
at the hospital during his employment. Second, just before Doe left the hospital, the
perpetrator gave Doe a phone number where Doe could contact him, asking him to call.
Astoundingly, with his parents' permission thereafter, Doe began seeing the perpetrator
and even spent the night with him at the perpetrators residence-with,

again, the

parent's permission. About this time, the hospital fired the perpetrator for inappropriate
conduct with male employees at the hospital, namely, inviting them to his residence and
promising them alcohol, although none had attained the age of 21 years. The Ada
County Prosecutor charged the perpetrator with lewd conduct with a minor based upon
his conduct with Doe, and the sentencing court sent him to prison.
Doe and his father brought the action against the perpetrator under the theory
the hospital had acted negligently in the hiring, supe~ising,and firing of a sexual
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
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predator. On summary judgment, the sole issue centered on whether the hospital's
stipulated breach of duty (further stipulated between the parties as the duty to use care
in hiring and supervising its employees and to protect its patients from harm at the
hands of its employees) had proximately caused Doe's injuries, namely, his molestation
at the hands of the former hospital employee.
While approving of Prosser and Keeton's approach to foreseeability analysis at
footnote 2 of their decision4Judge Lansing had this to say,
We note that the ldaho Pattern Jury Instruction 230
incorporates this [as explained in Alegda v. Payonk, supra]
foreseeability standard by specifying that proximate cause
means "a cause which, in natural or probable sequence,
produced the complained injury, loss or damage.. .." The
term "natural or probable sequence" implies a requirement of
foreseeability.
...w e conclude that the legal responsibility element
of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of the
defendant's negligent act the plaintiff's injury was reasonably
foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the
defendant's conduct (citing to the Prosser and Keeton
footnote comment referenced above).
126 ldaho at 1041, 895 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis in the original; bracketed material
added for context).
If, as seen, negligent entrustment amounts to nothing more than a particularized
application of the general tort principles contained in the concept of negligence, does it
mean, then, that courts will view "foreseeability" in the same way, regardless of its
application in garden-variety, common law tort as opposed to a particularized negligent
entrustment matter? If Justice Bistline was correct in his assessment (and until a higher

W. Page Keeton, et a/., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984), at

55 42-

43.
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court says he was not, for purposes of this court, he was), foreseeablility amounts to a
moving target. However, Defendant Robertson may not like the way it moves for him.
Where the degree of harm is great but preventing the harm is not difficult, a relatively
low degree of foreseeability operates, not one of a higher degree. Indeed, all Defendant
Robertson would have had to do to "prevent" the harm contemplated by ldaho Code §
49-916, at least for his part, was simply not loan it to Kukla until he (or Kukla, for that

matter) fixed the lights to work properly.
If foreseeability in ldaho po

principles to the negligent entrustment paradigm-at

least as it relates to the harm

flowing from the natural or probable consequence of the actor's conduct. This becomes
particularly evident when one considers the essential elements of negligent entrustment
generally recognized in the United States.
In an action based on the theory of neglige
entrustment, the plaintiff must prove that:

(I) the entrustee was incompetent,
inexperienced, or reckless;

unfit,

(2)

the entrustor knew (in some jurisdictions
"actually" knew), should have known, or had
reason to know of the entrustee's condition or
proclivities;

(3)

there was an entrustment of the dangerous
instrumentality;

(4)

the entrustment created an appreciable risk of
harm to others; and
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(5) the harm to the injury victim was "pr~ximately'~
or "legally" caused by the negligence of the
entrustor and the entrustee.
57A AM. JUR. 20 Negligence 5 3 1 8 (2004).
The plaintiffs correctly point out that our Supreme Court adopted the general
definition of negligent entrustment from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Their

counsel goes on to state, "Nothing in Ransom [v. City of Garden City, supra] purports to
limit the tort to cases of intoxicated or incapacitated drivers." That, of course, is true.
Nevertheless, one should never overlook the obvious, namely, Ransom dealt with an
intoxicated person with whom a police officer had
officer handed over the keys, he simply gave a warning to the intoxicated passenger
that he could not drive the car. (The police had already arrested the driver). Instead,
the police instructed the intoxicated passenger that he should keep trying to get a ride,
something the passenger had unsuccessful managed throughout the officer's presence
at the scene of the arrest.
foreseeable).

What followed next was easily predictable (AKA

After the police cleared the arrest scene, the intoxicated passenger,

now-turned-impaired driver, unattended (and possessing the keys to the car left with
him) promptly entered the car, drove the wrong way down a one-way street, and
collided head-on with another vehicle.

Following Justice Bistline's paradigm,

preventing this harm would have been relatively easy, viz. after arresting the driver, the
police simply do not give the keys to a car left behind to an intoxicated, left behind
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passenger.5 This court has not overlooked the fact that Defendant Robertson points
with significant energy to the comments of Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 308 (1965)
in Ransom. In particular, Defendant Robertson wants to ensure this court and the
plaintiffs understand Comment b. The Court does; however, it cannot speak for the
plaintiffs. Quoting from Defendant Robertson's initial memorandum in support of his
motion for summary judgment filed on 7 December 2007: "The rule may also apply 'if
the third person's known character or the peculiar circumstances of the case are such
as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person mav misuse it."' See

DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MEMORA

ed) .

There exists enough in the deposition material submitted to this court to make the
underlined portions a jury question.
Ironically, perhaps more telling is what the plaintiffs do in quoting the definition of
negligent entrustment from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in their memorandum of
opposition, perhaps to bolster their argument. Plaintiffs leave off its very significant title:
"Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in ~ctivities."~(Emphasis
added.)

Reading the Restatement (Second) of Torts on negligent entrustment

(including its title) and the Am. Jur. 2d material set out above, it seems clear that the
5

What is particularly aggravating about this case, apart from the obvious, amounts to the police turning
the intoxicated passenger into an intoxicated pedestrian, a misdemeanor, if they leave him at the side of a
road. See ldaho Code (j 49-1426.
ldaho has a long-standing rule of statutory construction providing that where the meaning of a statute
lacks clarity, resort may be had to consideration of the statutory heading as an aid in ascertaining
legislative intent. See e.g., Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corp. of ldaho, 102 ldaho 266, 268, 629 P.2d
662, 664 (1981), reh'g denied. This court is unaware of the same principle applying with precision in
discerning the meanings of the various Restatement declarations. Nevertheless, in consideration of (j
308's title, and in those cases in ldaho quoting either the Restatement (Second on Torts) or Ransom
where negligent entrustment was an issue, some "improper" person is always at the heart of the
discussion.
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particularized notion of applying general tort principles to entrustment in Idaho has to do
with entrusting a "dangerous instrumentality," assumed herein to be a motorized vehicle
towing a hay baler, to someone otherwise incompetent, unfit, inexperienced, or
reckless. Further, the person doing the entrusting either must know or should have
known (or at least have had some reason to know) that the person so entrusted with the
instrumentality constituted an "improper" person to have the instrumentality in the first
place because it created an appreciable risk of harm to others.
What in the record, then, supports the notion of incompetence, unfitness,
inexperienced, or, perhaps most relevant, recklessness with regard to Darrell Robertson
loaning Dustin Kukla a tractor and hay baler? Put another way, how was Dustin Kukla
incompetent, unfit, inexperienced, or reckless in handling tractors or hay balers that
Darrell Robertson knew about, should have known, or had reason to know?

At

argument, counsel mentioned that Mr. Robertson should have known or had reason to
know that Dustin Kukla would move the baler at night. Baling at night seems to be the
custom in these parts. See generally the March 11, 2005 deposition of Darrell L
Robertson at page 38, line 25; page 39, lines 1-6. Should one be able to conclude
naturally, then, that if one bales at night, we can expect the person operating the baler
to move it on a highway at night? That seems to be a jury question. Even if one
concludes that under the foreseeability concept of Tort as practiced in Idaho, it dictated
Kukla most likely would move the baler at night on a highway, does evidence exist
pointing to lacking experience, fitness or competence, or being reckless. Again, that
remains a question for the jury, as set out more fully below.
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2. Material Issues of Fact Are Present For Negligent Entrustment

As already noted in Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross, supra, resolving proximate
cause and foreseeability questions is best left to the province of the trier of fact. The
plaintiffs have demanded a jury trial in this litigation. In the matter before the court,
reasonable minds could definitely come to differing conclusions on whether Defendant
Robertson's act of loaning his tractor and hay baler to Dustin Kukla, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, could reasonablv be foreseen as the start point of a firstconsider second- or third-order effects) that natural1
order effect (not even having to consid
and probably led to Kenneth T
this court to make that decision.
For example, the jury must decide whether Defendant Robertson could
reasonably foresee that Dustin Kukla would likely drive a tractor and baler missing
proper lamps on a highway at night. They could very well base their decision upon
expert testimony that in Canyon County, at least, one ex

and ranchers to

drive balers on highways at night. The "expert" testimony could be nothing more than a
series of farmers and ranchers testifying about common practices among their fellow
ranchers and farmers, all of which they have personal familiarity. Thus, the parties must
call upon the jury to decide if Defendant Robertson's act of loaning a tractor and baler to
Dustin Kukla without informing Kukla about the lamps on the baler failing to comply with
Idaho law for nighttime operation constituted a negligent act that naturally led to the
death of Kenneth Tiegs. That is, the jury must decide the nexus in this series of events
because, as set out more fully in the next section, resolution of material issues of fact
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remain. Compare e.g., Dustin Kukla deposition of April 26, 2005, at page 117, lines 1625; page 118, lines 1-2 with Darrell Robertson deposition of March 11, 2005, at page
52, line 25, page 53, lines 1-25; page 54, line I;
C. A GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT ALSO EXIST ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIM

The plaintiffs also assert that Defendant Robertson committed negligence per se
when Defendant Kukla operated the tractor and baler on Highway 45 at night without
properly operating lights.

Defendant Robertson, on the other hand, asserts no

negligence per se exists because no evidence exists supporting the notion that
Robertson caused or knowingly permitted Kukla to operate the equipment on a public
roadway after sunset without proper lighting equipment. In supporting his assertion
about the lack of negligence per se, Defendant Robertson focuses on Idaho Code § 49902. That provision states the following:

(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, or
for the owner to cause or knowinalv permit to be driven or
moved on any hiahwav any vehicle or combination of
vehicles which is in an unsafe condition as to endanger any
person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all
times equipped with the lamps and other requirements in
proper condition and adjustment, as required by the
provisions of this chapter, or which is equipped in any
manner in violation of the ~rovisionsof this chapter.
(2) Nothing contained in the provisions of this chapter shall
be construed to prohibit the use of additional parts and
accessories on any vehicle not inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter.

(3) The ~rovisionsof this chapter, with respect to equipment
on vehicles, shall not apply to implements of husbandry,
road machinew, road rollers, farm tractors or slow movinq
vehicles except as otherwise specificallv made applicable.
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ldaho Code 5 49-902 (emphasis added).
Clearly, the legislature specifically exempted "implements of husbandry" (along
with road machinery, road rollers, farm tractors or other slow moving vehicles) from the
operation of Chapter 9 of Title 49 of the ldaho Code for equipment purposes, unless,
s~ecificallv~
the legislature makes such vehicles applicable.

Hence, we must now

consider ldaho Code 5 49-916 because first, the plaintiffs focus on it to make their claim
of negligence per se, and second, it discusses implements of husbandry and lighting
equipment requi

ect matter at the very heart of this litigation.

Defendant Robertson, in his Memorandum in support of his motion for
summary judgment, admits that the baler was not equipped for nighttime operation on a
public roadway in accordance with ldaho Code 5 49-916. The latter provision reads as
follows.
49-916. LAMPS ON FARM TRACTORS, FARM
EQUIPMENT AND IMPLEMENTS OF HUSBANDRY.
(1) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled farm
J equipped with
equipment unit or implement of husbandry p
an electric lighting system shall at all times specified in
section 49-903, ldaho Code,' be equipped with at least one
(1) lamp displaying a white light visible from a distance of not
less than five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle
and shall also be equipped with at least one (1) lamp
displayinn a red light visible from at least the same distance
to the rear of the vehicle, and two (2) red reflectors visible
from a distance of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600)
7

ldaho Code $ 49-903 requires every vehicle upon a highway at any time from sunset to sunrise, among
other times of limited visibility, to have liahted lamps and illuminating devices. However, the notion that
ldaho Code $ 49-903 limits the time when operable headlamps are required for automobiles was soundly
rejected by our Court of Appeals in State v. Evans, 134 ldaho 560, 6 P.3d 416 (Ct. App. 2000). As
detailed post, the reasoning applied in Evans to interpreting the effect of the interplay of ldaho Code $49903 with ldaho Code $ 49-902(1), should equally apply to ldaho Code $ 49-916. The issue presented in
the statutes amounts to one of safety, not some ill-devised exclusionary rule for a certain class of ldaho
residents, namely farmers and ranchers moving unsafe implements of husbandry on Idaho's highways.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-20

feet to the rear when illuminated by the upper beams of head
lamps. Lights required in this section shall be positioned so
that one ( I ) lamp showing to the front and one (1) lamp or
reflector showing to the rear will indicate the further
projection of the tractor, unit or implement on the side of the
road used in passing the vehicle.
(2) Every combination of farm tractor and towed unit of
farm equipment or implement of husbandry not equipped
with an electric lighting system shall at all times specified in
section 49-903, ldaho Code, be equipped with the following:
lamp mounted to indicate as
(a) At least one (I)
nearly as practicable the extreme left projection of the
combination and dis~lavinqa white light visible from a
distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet to the
front of the combination;
(b) Two (2) red reflectors visible from a distance one
hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to the rear of
the combination when illuminated by the upper beams
of head lamps. The reflectors shall be mounted in a
manner to indicate as nearly as practicable the extreme
left and right rear projections of the towed unit or
implement on the highway.
(3) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled unit of
farm equipment of implement of husbandry equipped with an
electric lightina system shall at all times specified in section
49-903, ldaho Code, be equipped with two (2) single-beam
or multi~le-beamhead lamps meeting the requirements of
sections 49-922 or 49-924, ldaho Code, respectivelv or, as
an alternative, section 49-926, ldaho Code, and two (2) red
lamps visible from a distance of not less than five hundred
(500) feet to the rear, or in the alternative, one (1) red lam^
visible from a distance of not less than five hundred (500)
feet to the rear and two (2) red reflectors visible from a
distance of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to
the rear when illuminated by the upper beams of head
lamps. Red lamps or reflectors shall be mounted in the rear
of the farm tractor or self-propelled implement of husbandry
to indicate as nearly as practicable the extreme left and right
projections of the vehicle on the highway.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-21

(4) The farm tractor element of every combination of farm
tractor and towed farm equipment or towed implement of
husbandry equipped with an electric lighting system shall at
all times specified in section 49-903, ldaho Code, be
equipped with two (2) single-beam or multiple-beam head
lamps meeting the requirements of sections 49-922, 49-924,
or 49-926, ldaho Code.
ldaho Code § 49-916 (emphasis added).
f

. Statutory Construction in General

When interpreting a statute, courts must construe the statute as a whole in order
to give effect to the legislative intent. Paoline v. Albertson's lnc.,143 ldaho 547, 549,
149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006); State v. Evans, 134 ldaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 4
App. 2000); George Watkins Family v. Messeng@r,118 ldaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d
1385, 1387-88 (1990); Zener v. Velde, 135 ldaho 352, 355, 17 P.3d 296, 299 (Ct. App.
2000), rev. denied. Accordingly, the plain language of the statute generally determines
legislative intent. Id; State v. Nunes, 131 ldaho 408, 409, 958 P.2d 34, 35 (Ct. App.
1998). The plain meaning of a statute prevails unless at least one of two factors comes
into play: (1) clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary to the plain meaning or (2)
the plain meaning leads to an absurd result. Watkins Family, 118 ldaho at 540, 797
P.2d at 1388; Zener, 135 ldaho at 355, 17 P.3d at 299. See also State v. Rhode, 133
ldaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). Statutory interpretation, then, "must begin
with the literal words of the statute" and these words "must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 ldaho 810, 813,
135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Plain language is "always to be preferred to any curious,
narrow hidden sense." State v. Mercer, 143 ldaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006).
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It is axiomatic, then, that when statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
statutory interpretation is not necessary. Haydtjn Lake Fire Profecfion Disf. v. Aicom,
141 ldaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005). That is to say, when statutes possess
clarity and a lack of ambiguity, courts must "interpret" them in accordance with their
language; meaning courts must follow them as enacted-not

even reviewing courts may

apply rules of construction. State v. Evans, supra; Sfafe v. Dewbre, 133 ldaho 663,
665-66, 991 P.2d 388, 390-91 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131 ldaho 484,
485, 959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). Ironically, plain statutory language can exist
even where parties present different

to the court. Ambiguity, on the other

hand, occurs where "reasonable minds might differ as to interpretations." Id.
We know from State v. Evans, supra, that ldaho Code § 49-903 does not qualify
when the "lamps and other requirements" must be on motor vehicles for purposes of
ldaho Code § 49-902, simply when they must be "turned on." That is to say, "This
statute [ldaho Code § 49-9031 does not authorize the operation of vehicles with
inoperable headlights on ldaho highways." 134 ldaho at 564, 6 P.3d at 420. Judge
Schwartzman goes on to illustrate why the Court of Appeals came to this conclusion.
For numerous reasons, operable headlights may be
unexpectedly required long before sunset; sudden changes
of weather; agricultural dust; smoke from burning fields or
forest fires to name a few. We therefore conclude that
Evans' reading of I.C. 5 49-903 as permitting the o~eration
of vehicles with ino~erableheadlights before sunset is
inconsistent with Idaho's policy off providing safe highwav
system.

Id (emphasis added).
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Herein, Defendant Robertson makes a similar argument. He essentially argues
that it is permissible to move farm equipment (otherwise equipped with an electrical
lighting system) on the highways of this state, even if their lighting systems do not
function properly, provided drivers do not move them after sunset or before sunrise.
Yet, there are other times required apart from hours of darkness under ldaho Code 3
49-903 when the legislature expects the lighting system to be operational, namely, "any
other time where there is not sumcient light to render clearly discernable persons and
vehicles on the highway at a distance of five hundred (500) feet ahead
Consistent with the reasoning in State v. Evans, s

...IJ

ode § 49-916

refers to ldaho Code § 49-903 for the times machinery operators must turn on the lights.
The lighting systems, otherwise required, must be turned on during those times set out
in ldaho Code § 49-903. Clearly, the legislature expects the lighting systems to be
operational at all times. Around these parts, blowing dust can obscure a roadway at
any time during the summer, not to mention smoke from forest fires. Accordingly, if the
lighting equipment is not operational as required by ldaho Code 5 49-916 with regard to
farm equipment, one simply does not move it on a highway. To do so, violates the plain
provisions of the statutory law, which Defendant Robertson allowed with Dustin Kukla.
Finally, to contend, as Defendant Robertson apparently does, that ldaho Code §
49-916 defines no duty for the owner versus the operator-meaning that no duty for the
owner equals no liability for the owner-seems to fall short of the mark, at least when
one considers the statutes in pan' materia, which this court must. "'Statutes that are in
pan'materia must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pan'
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materia if they relate to the same subject."' Paolini v. Albertan's lm., supra, citing City

of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Disf., 139 ldaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909

The entirety of Chapter 9 of Title 49 of the ldaho Code deals with Vehicle
Equipment.

ldaho Code

5

49-902 covers what its title calls "Scope and effect."

Subsection (3) of this paragraph specifically addresses "implements of husbandry," also
specifically addressed in Idaho Code

5

49-916.

It seems, then, that courts must

construe ldaho Code 5 49-902 in pan' materia with ldaho Code 5 49-916 since both deal
with equipment going to the very heart of safety and contained within the same chapter.
To make ldaho Code $j 49-916 a stand-alone provision, thus allowing the owner of an
implement of husbandry to escape culpability when the scope and effect provision
(Idaho Code

5 49-902) clearly states, "It shall be unlawful for

any person to drive, or

move, or for the owner to cause or knowinalv permit to be driven or moved on any
highway, etc.," seems to lead to an absurd result.

Litigants and other interested

observers have traditionally expected courts to guard against absurd results. Watkins
Family, supra.

2. Negligence Per Se
To appropriate the doctrine of negligence per se as a basis for imposing liability
in Idaho, the injured party must show four things. First, the statute must clearly define
the standard of conduct. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian lrrigafion District, 97 ldaho 580,
586, 548 P.2d 80, 86 (1976) reh'gs denied (where the Court concluded that since ldaho
Code 5 42-1204 did not clearly define the standard of conduct, injured parties could not
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use it to hold an irrigation district accountable under the doctrine of negligence per se;
the court, however, concluded the trial court had used the statute for imposing a duty in
its findings, not imposing liability). Second, the legislature must have intended the
statute to prevent the type of harm caused. Stephens v. Steams, 106 ldaho 249, 257
678 P.2d 41, 49 (1984) reh'g denied (where the Court found that an architect failing to
comply with an ordinance regarding stairways and handrails constituted negligence per
se since the Court concluded the ordinance was designed to protect users from the very
type of injury suffered by the plaintiff). Third, the plaintiff must be of the class of persons
intended for protection under the statute or code in the first instance. Kinney v. Smith,
supra at 331, 508 P.2d at 1237 (1973) (where the Court concluded that an owner of a
vehicle who knowingly permitted another person with a suspended license to drive the
owner's car violated the provisions of ldaho Code 5 49-339, hence negligence per se)!
Finally, the violation of the statute or code must comprise the proximate cause of the
injury. Leliefield v. Johnson, 104 ldaho 357, 370, 659 P.2d 111, 124 (1983) (Even
though a violation of a statute enacted for public safety is negligence per se, the
violation must also be the proximate cause of the injury to constitute actionable
negligence). See also O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 ldaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005).
Using the above-cited authority as a template for determining as a matter of law
whether ldaho Code

5

49-916, in conjunction with ldaho Code

5

49-902, may be

advanced by the plaintiffs as a basis for negligence per se, this court answers in the

Now re-designated as ldaho Code $ 49-333. As Chief Justice Donaldson noted. "In our view. I.C. $49339 is designed to protect other highway users from injuries caused by the negligence of unlicensed
drivers." 95 ldaho at 331, 508 P.2d at 1237.
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affirmative.

This court has already considered Defendant Robertson's knowledge

based upon his experience in farming practices that farmers and ranchers in Canyon
County typically perform hay baling in the evening hours after sunset, referenced in his
March 11, 2005 deposition.

The issue, however, centers on resolving whether

Defendant Robertson "caused" to be driven, or, in the alternative, "knowingly permittedJJ
to be driven or moved on any highway, the tractor and baler loaned to Dustin Kukla.
That is clearly undisputed when Defendant Robertson allowed Dustin Kukla to drive off
with his tractor and baler during daytime hours with the defective lighting equipment.
Since Defendant Robertson put into motion (by loaning machinery to K
events that led to the death of Kenneth Tiegs, it remains for the jury to decide whether
there exists a nexus between Robertson's loaning his machinery to Kukla and
Robertson "causing or knowingly permittingJJKukla to operate the equipment on
Highway 45 at the time and place that resulted in Kenneth Tiegs' demise.

D. IMPUTED LIABILITY DOES APPLY BECAUSE A TRACTOR PULLING A BALER
MEETS THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES OF IDAHO CODE
5 49-2417.
Using the techniques of statutory construction, ante, it appears that an implement
of husbandry (i.e., a tractor pulling a hay baler) constitutes a motor vehicle for purposes
of Idaho Code § 49-2417.

The legislature has elected to define implements of

husbandry 'as follows.
"Implements of husbandryJ'means evew vehicle includinq
self-propelled units, designed or adapted and used
exclusively in agricultural, horticultural, dairy and livestock
growing and feeding operations when being incidentally
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. Such

implements include, but are not limited to,
combines, discs, dry and liquid fertilizer spreaders, cargo
tanks, harrows, hay balers, harvesting and stacking
equipment, pesticide applicators, plows, swathers, mint tubs
and mint wagons, and farm wagons. A farm tractor when
attached to or drawina any implement of husbandry shall be
construed to be an implement of husbandry. "Implements of
husbandry" do not include semitrailers, nor do they include
motor vehicles or trailers, unless their design limits their use
to agricultural, horticultural, dairy or livestock grow in^ and
feeding operations.
ldaho Code 5 49-1 10(2)(emphasis added).
What is readily apparent from this definition is that it comprises a highly specific
description of what constitutes "implements of husbandry" in t

orthy is

the addition in the list of examples of hay balers. ldaho Code 5 49-1 10(2), when read in
conjunction with ldaho Code 5 49-123(2)(d), makes it clear that a farm tractor attached
to or pulling "any implement of husbandry,''-if
otherwise-"shall

it might be considered something else,

be construed as an implement of husbandry." Hence, Defendant

Robertson's tractor pulling his hay baler is not a farm vehicle, but rather, an implement
of husbandry.
~
As suggested already, imputed liability comprises a creature of ~ t a t u t e .Thus,
whether Defendant Robertson's motorized machinery coupled together and driven by
Dustin Kukla on the fateful evening in question amounts to a motor vehicle for purposes
of imputing liability under the auspices of ldaho Code § 49-2417 amounts to an exercise
of statutory construction. Unfortunately, the process of statutory construction can seem
more circular and iterative than linear and progressive. Nevertheless, the real issue
presented to this court on the issue of imputed liability involving a hay baler and tractor,
See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS g 73 (W. KEETON 5th ed. 1984).
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comes down to this: whether the legislature intended to exclude "implements of
husbandryJJ
from the definition of "motor vehicleJ'for purposes of Idaho's imputed liability
statute. The reason this becomes an exercise in statutory construction centers on the
fact the legislature does not state in the general definition of motor vehicle or, frankly, in
the definition of 'implement of husbandryJ1
that the two are mutually exclusive, at least
for purposes of imputed liability.
ldaho Code § 49-2417 addresses a "motor vehicleJJowner's liability in tort for the
negligence of another. Its pertinent provisions, in view of the facts presented, comprise
the following.
(1) Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and
responsible for the death of or injury to a person or property
resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor
vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any
person using or operating the vehicle with the permission,
expressed or implied, of the owner, and the negligence of
the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of
civil damages.
(2) The liability of an owner for im~utedneqligence
imposed by the provisions of this section and not arising
through the relationship of principal and agent or master and
servant is limited to the amounts set forth under "proof of
financial res~onsibility"in section 49-1 17, ldaho Code, or the
limits of the liability insurance maintained bv the owner,
whichever is areater.
(3) In any action against an owner for imputed negligence
as imposed by the provisions of this section the operator of
the vehicle whose negligence is imputed to the owner shall
be made a defendant party if personal service of process
can be had upon that operator within Idaho. Upon recovery
of a judgment, recourse shall first be had against the
property of the operator so served.
(4) In the event a recovery is had under the provisions of
this section against an owner for imputed negligence the
owner is subrogated to all the rights of the person injured
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and may recover from the operator the total amount of any
judgment and costs recovered against the owner. If the
bailee of an owner with the permission, expressed or
implied, of the owner, permits another to operate the motor
vehicle of the owner, then the bailee and the driver shall both
be deemed operators of the vehicle of the owner, within the
meaning of subsections (3) and (4) of this section.
(5) Where two (2) or more persons are injured or killed in
one (1) accident, the owner may settle or pay any bona fide
claim for damages arising out of personal injuries or death,
whether reduced to a judgment or not, and the payments
shall diminish to the extent of the owners' total liability on
account of the accident. Payments so made, aggregating the
full sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), shall extinguish
all liability of the owner hereunder to the claimants and all
other persons on account of the accident. Liability may exist
by reason of imputed negligence, pursuant to this section,
and not arising through the negligence of the owner nor
through the relationship of principal and agent nor master
and servant.
ldaho Code § 49-2417(emphasis added).
What is a motor vehicle, at least in general terms? ''Every vehicle which is selfpropelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from
overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelc
ldaho Code § 49-123(2)(g)(emphasis added).

One must not overlook the glaring fact

that the legislature did not except "implements of husbandryJJ
from this definition when it
excepted "vehicles moved solely by human power (which seems somewhat of a waste
of ink), electric personal assistive mobility devices, and motorized wheelchairs.
Whether the imputed negligence statute applies to the facts of this case, then, depends
upon whether the legislature intended that a tractor pulling a hay baler constitutes a
motor vehicle for purposes of imputed liability. Again, not surprisingly Defendant
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Robertson claims this provision does not apply while the plaintiffs are quite certain that it
does.
Without question, a tractor pulling a hay baler constitutes an "implement of
husbandry." What remains to be answered, however, is the "So what?" question.
Inventorying and considering all of the statutes found by this court that include the terms
"implement(s) of husbandry" or "vehicles of husbandry," there exist specific and solid
public policy reasons for excluding "husbandry vehicles from specific requirements.
However, these ex
equipment issues. F
and C license known as a "seasonal driver's license," that allows the operation of
certain commercial vehicles in farm-related industries under restrictions imposed by the
department of transportation. However, these seasonal driver's licenses are not valid
for driving vehicles carrying hazardous materials that require placarding, unless certain
exceptions apply.

Those exceptions include transporting diesel fuel, provided the

quantity does not exceed one-thousand gallons, transportin
or implements of husbandry, provided the total capacity o f t
three thousand gallons, or solid plant nutrient
mixture with any organic substance. Hence, through this statute, we discover how the
legislature makes exception for an "implement of husbandry," that is, it does so by
specific reference to an "implement of husbandry." Several other examples exist, as
well.
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To determine "gross combination weight rating (GCWR) in ldaho Code

3 49-

108(2), the legislature chose not to include implements of husbandry. Similarly, the
legislature, by specific term, excluded "implements of husbandry" from its definition of
"utility type vehicle (UTV)" found at ldaho Code 5 49-122(8) and again in ldaho Code §
67-7101. Under ldaho Code § 49-302(1), the legislature specifically exempted persons
from driver's licensing requirements if they operate an implement of husbandry
"incidentally" on a highway, as long as their license is not otherwise suspended,
canceled, revoked, disqualified, denied or refused. Again, the legislature specifically
used the term "implement of husbandryJJto make this exclusion. The legislature also
exempted, with specificity, "implements of husbandryJJfrom motor vehicle registration
requirements pursuant to ldaho Code

5 49-426(2).

The legislature has also specifically

used the term "implement of husbandry" to exclude the requirement of persons under
eighteen years of age to wear approved safety helmets where they use motorcycles or
ATVs as implements. The legislature did so by specific use of the term, occupants of
"implements of husbandry." See ldaho Code § 49-673(2)(b). 49-673(2)(b). By specific
term of "implement of husbandry", the legislature exempted implements of husbandry
from width requirements, provided they are only "incidentally" being operated upon a
highway from one (1) farm operation to another during daylight hours and display a red
or fluorescent orange flag of twelve by twelve inches on the outermost left projection of
the implement being transported. ldaho Code § 49-4 01O(l)(a)-(c). By definition, the
legislature has chosen to exclude, with specificity, "vehicles of husbandryJJand "vehicles
registered pursuant to ldaho Code §§ 49-402 and 49-402A from the definition of a farm
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vehicle. Hence, when the legislature has wanted to exclude '7mplement(s) [or vehicles]
of husbandry" from a requirement, it has consistently done so by specifically referring to
these vehicles.
Accordingly, has the legislature exempted "implement of husbandryJJfrom the
requirements of ldaho Code 5 49-2417? Without question, "implement of husbandryJJ
is
not referenced in this statute, nor is the term referenced in the general definition of
motor vehicle found in ldaho Code 5 49-123(g). It is one thing for the legislature to say
"'Implements off husbandry' do not inclu
their [i.e., the motor vehicles'] use to agricult

ss their design limits
or livestock growing

and feeding operations," which, of course it does proclaim in ldaho Code § 49-11O(2). If
this meant the legislature intended for motor vehicles

to encompass "implements of

husbandry," that is, since "implements of husbandryJJdo not include motor vehicles
unless they are limited to agricultural, horticultural, dairy or livestock growing and
feeding operations, motor vehicles, by implied definition, do not include "implements of
husbandry, " the legislature wasted its time, ink, and confused judges by specifically
exempting "implements of husbandryJJfrom the operation of ldaho Code § 49-902,
unless otherwise specifically made applicable, while not specifically exempting such
implements from the specific definition of "motor vehicleJJcontained in ldaho Code $j 49123(g) and as applied in ldaho Code $j 49-2417.
Using the plain meaning of the statutes, interpreting them in pan materia, this
court is certain that the legislature has not implicitly excluded owners of "implements of
husbandryJJwhen otherwise "self-propelled" from the operation of ldaho Code

5

49-
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2417. To be sure, hay balers do not constitute motor vehicles. However, tractors that
pull them, being self-propelled, do comprise motor vehicles for purposes of the general
definition, and, unless a Higher Court or the legislature says otherwise, for purposes of
ldaho Code ldaho Code $ 49-2417.

This court is surprised that it came to this

conclusion, but having seen how the legislature excepts "implements of husbandry"
from the operation of statutes when it does not want such implements implicated in the
operation of the statute in question, and seeing how "implements of husbandry" are not
excluded from either the definition of motor vehicle or the operation of ldaho Code 5 492417, the court is convinced that if the legislature wanted to exclude "implements of
husbandry," from Idaho's imputed negligence statute, it would have done so.

CONCLUSION

The court should deny the summary judgment motions of Defendant Robertson.
The court will adhere to the original decision by Judge Hoff.
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT:

I.

The court DENIES Defendant Robertson's motion for summary judgment.

2.

If the parties are prepared, they will try the matter before a jury beginning
March 24, 2008, beginning at 0930 a.m., for five days.

3.

If the parties are not prepared to go on that date, they will forthwith inform the
undersigned's secretary and arrange a new scheduling conference.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-34

D A T E P F s 7" day of February, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on "I day of February, 2008, s h e sewed a true and
correct copy of the original of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the
following individuals in the manner described:
Upon Eric S. Rossman, ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, at 737 ~ . Street,
7 ~
Boise, Idaho 83702, Terrance R. White, WWITE PETERSON, at 5700 East
Franklin Road, Ste. 200, Nampa, Idaho 83687 ,and upon Jan P. Malmberg,
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY, P.O. Box 364, Logan Utah 84323, attorneys
for plaintiffs, and upon
Rodney R. Saetrum and David W. Lloyd, SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, aMomeys
for the Defendant Robertson, at P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707
when s h e deposited each a copy in the U.S. Mail with sufficient postage to individuals
at the addresses listed above.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court

By:

I

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
J DRAKE, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
BRUCE TIEGS, STEVEN TIEGS; and
SUSAN HUTER,
Plaintiffs,

CASE N O ~ V

-4001-C

d2 7 5 - 7 7 3 7 2

vs.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
DUSTIN M. KUKLA and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,
Defendants

In this civil action, the parties tried the cause to a jury, which answered questions
on a special verdict form on 18 July 2008 as follows. To Question I , addressing
whether Darrell Robertson loaning a certain tractor and hay baler to Dennis Kukla
constituted negligence, the jury unanimously answered, "Yes."

To Question 2,

addressing whether the negligence found (in Question 1) on the part of Darrell
Robertson constituted a proximate cause of the decedent's death and the injuries
suffered by the Plaintiffs, eleven of twelve jurors answered, "No." To Question 3,
addressing whether the negligence of Dustin Kukla amounted to a proximate cause of
decedent's death and the injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs, eleven of twelve jurors
answered, "Yes."

To Question 4, addressing whether Darrell Robertson negligently

entrusted Dustin Kukla with a tractor and baler, the jury unanimously answered, "No."

ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-1

Because of the negative answer to Question 4, the jury correctly skipped
Question 5. To Question 6, addressing whether Dustin Kukla's operation of the tractor
and baler in question on the highway at the time for the occurrence, happened with the
express or implied permission of Darrell Robertson, the jury unanimously answered,
"No." Due to the negative answer to Question 6, the jury correctly skipped Question 7
With regard to Question 8, addressing whether Kenneth Tiegs (the decedent)
negligently operated his vehicle at the time and place of the occurrence, nine of twelve
jurors answered, "Yes."

Notwithstanding the affirmative answer to Question 8, in

Question 9, when asked whether Kenneth Tiegs' negligent operation of his vehicle
constituted a proximate cause of his death, inexplicably, the jury unanimously
answered, "No."

What makes this answer so strange (notwithstanding defense

counsel's erudite argument on how the jury's verdict does not amount to an inconsistent
verdict) is found in the jury's answer to Question 10: the jury apportioned Kenneth
Tiegs' fault at 5 %.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs timely filed their motion for a new trial under three theories:
IRCP 49(a), 49(b), and 59(a)(6). In opposing a new trial, Defendant Robertson argues
that the jury throughout the process found that Robertson's negligence did not comprise
a proximate cause of Kenneth Tiegs death or the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
Yet, as cogently pointed out by Plaintiffs' counsel in his Reply Memorandum, Robertson
fails to address how the verdict could be anything but inconsistent, hence, against the
law, in view of Instruction 20.
The court certainly understands Defendant Robertson's attempt to produce a silk
purse out of the sow's ear delivered by the jury last July. However, taking all of the

ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-2

"1

~

evidence heard by this court, the same evidence heard by the jury, this court cannot
conceive how the jury came to the conclusion it did with regard to appodioned fault on
Defendant Robertson's behalf when they claim none of his actions proximately caused
Kenneth Tiegs' death. Having said that, although the parties agreed to the form of the
special verdict form used, it may have very well have led to what appears to be a
confusion on the part of the jury when read with Instruction 20.
Accordingly, this court finds and concludes the verdict delivered by the jury with
regard to the answers given on proximate cause relating to Defendant Robertson's
conduct amount to an inconsistency with their apportionment of damages.

Henc

pursuant to IRCP 49(b), the court finds the Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial, unless
the parties stipulate to judgment, as set out in paragraph 2, below.
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT:
1. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties as set out in paragraph 2, below,
the court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
2. If the parties agree to a judgment on the amount of $100,000.00 for noneconomic damages, with an apportionment of 20% fault to Darrell Robertson and 80%
fault to Dustin Kukla, equally divided amount the three Plaintiffs, they may present to the
court a stipulated judgment conforming to the
,

$ U 0

2

e no later than 15 December 2008.

$D o A tthis ~
c20 O
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The undersigned certifies that on
the forgoing ORDER ON MOT!
described:
a

October 2008 slhe served a true and correct copy of the original of

N FOR NEW TRIAL on the following individuals in the manner

Upon Eric S. Rossman and Chad M. Nicholson, ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, attorneys for
Plaintiffs, at 737 N. 7th Street, Boise, ldaho 83702; and upon
Rodney R. Saetrum, SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, attorneys for Defendant Robertson, PO Box
7425, Boise, Idaho 83707

when slhe caused the same to be deposited into the US Mails, sufficient postage attached.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court

ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-4

Rodney R. Saetmm ISBN: 292 1
David Mr. Lloyd ISBN: 5501
SMTRUM LAW OFFICES
P.O. Box 7425
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-0484

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
7:CRAWFORD, DEPUW

Attomeys for Defendant Dare11 L. Robertson

INTHE DISTMCT COURT OF THE THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
m W T H TEGS and SONS, INC as
subrogee of W G m I N S W C E ,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 04-4001
NOTICE O F APPEAL

DUSTIN M. KUKLA; and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,
Defendants.

)
I
TO:

E S P O m E m S , a W T H TEGS and SONS, LNC, AND ITS ATTORNEYS,
ANI> TEE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT:
1. Appellant, DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, appeals against Respondent to the Idaho

Supreme Court from:
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFXNDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, entered in the above-entitled action on the 7* day
of February, 2008, HONORABLE Gordon W. Petrie presiding.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, entered in the above-entitled action on
the 20' day of October, 2008, HONORABLE Gordon W. Petrie presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the orders described
in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to I.A.R. 1l(a)(l).
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

3.

The preliminary statement of issues on appeal are:

(1) Whether the District Court erred in its decision that motor vehicle
statutory liability is imputed to f m equipment.
(2) Whether District Court erred in its decision to proceed with
vague allegations of negligence as to Defendant Robertson.

(3)

Whether District Court erred in its decision to grant a new

trial.
Appellant does

4.

request the preparation of a reporter's standard transcript as

defined in the Idaho Appellate Rules.
Appellant requests the following transcripts:
The transcript of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of
March 8,2006.
The transcript of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of
January 3,2008.
The transcript of the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial.
5. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the CLERK'S record in
addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rules Rule 28:
a. Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Stuntnary Judgment;
b. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Summary
Judgment;
c. Affidavit of Howell in Support of Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Summary
Judgment;
d. Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment;
e. Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment;
f. Affidavit of Darrell L. Robertson
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

g. Affidavit of Michael A. Pope;
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mike Kukla's Motion for Summary
Judpent;

i. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary
Judment;
j.

Affidavit of Erica Phillips in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment; and

6. I certify:

(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter.
(b) That the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court as been paid the estimated fee

for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Idaho Appellant Rules Rule 20.

SAETRUM LAW OFFICES

Attorneys for Darrell L. ~ o b J h o n
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

I W E E B Y CERTlFY that on this

L
C

day of November 2008, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to:
Eric S. Rossrnan
Erica S. Phillips
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702

J US. Mail

Terrence R. Wfu te
WHITE PETERSON
5700 East Franklin Road
Suite 200
Nampa, ID 83687

&.S.

Mail
Hand DeIivery
Ovemight Mail
Facsimile

Jan P. Malmberg, P.C.
PERRY, MALkiBERG & PERRY
99 North Main Street
P.O. Box 364
Logan, Utah 84323-0364

/t

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Dustin Kukla
6601 W. Dickman Rd.
Melba, Idaho 83641

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

/

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petr~e

Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dust~nMichael Kukla, etal.
Kenneth T~egsAnd Sons vs, Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson

Other Claims
Date

Judae
New Case Filed-Other Claims

Bradly S. Ford

Summons Issued (2)

Bradly S. Ford

Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid
by: Jan Malmberg Receipt number: 0127557 Dated: 7/25/2005 Amount:
$82.00 (Check)

Bradly S. Ford

Filing: I I A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than $1000 No Prior
Bradly S. Ford
Appearance Paid by: Saetrum, Rodney R (attorney for Robertson, Darrell)
Receipt number: 013141 1 Dated: 8/16/2005 Amount: $52.00 (Check)
Notice Of Appearance

Bradly S. Ford

Sheriffs Return served

Bradly S. Ford

Motion for disqualification

Bradly S. Ford

Order for disqualification judge ford

Bradly S. Ford

Change Assigned Judge

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Order of Assignment

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Def Darrell Robertsons Answer & demand for JT (fax

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Order Setting Case and Scheduling Order

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 12/06/2005 09:OO AM) 1 Day Court Trial

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 11/04/2005 02:OO PM)

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Sheriffs Return 9-8-05

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/03/2005 09:30 AM) to stay
proceedings

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Motion to stay proceedings

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Notice Of Hearing 11/03/2005

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Defendnat Darrell Robertson's Pretrial conference statement (fax)

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/03/2005 09:30 AM: Hearing
Held to stay proceedings

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 12/06/2005 09:OO AM: Hearing
Vacated 1 Day Court Trial

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 11/04/2005 02:OO PM: Hearing
Vacated

James A. (J.R.) Schiller

Change Assigned Judge

Renae J. Hoff

Consolidation Of Files w/CV2004-4001 *C

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/02/2006 11:30 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0411812006 09:OO AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/01/2005 09:OO AM) Summary
Judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Order consolidating canyon county case numbers CV04-4001 and
CVO5-7739

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/01/2005 09:OO AM: Interim
Hearing Held motion to continue summ jmt granted

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/05/2006 09:OO AM) summary
judgment

Renae J. Hoff
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Case: 6V-2005-0007739-C Current Judge. Gordon W Petr~e

Kenneth T~egsAnd Sons vs. Dust~nM~chaelKukla, etal.
Kenneth T~egsAnd Sons vs, Dustin M~chaelKukla, Darrell Robertson

Other Claims
Date

Judge
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/05/2006 09:OO AM: Motion
Held summary judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Motion Granted - motion to continue

Renae J. Hoff

Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment

Gordon W Petrie

Affidavit of Darrel L. Robertson

Gordon W Petrie

Affidavit of Michael A. Pope

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Hearing

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/08/2006 01 :30 PM) summary
judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Service

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Service

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Gordon W Petrie
Summary Judgment
Order resetting pre-trial

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/08/2006 03:OO PM) summary
judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/08/2006 03:OO PM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/08/2006 03:OO PM: Motion
Held summary judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/08/2006 03:OO PM: Motion
Denied summary judgment

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 03/08/2006 03:OO PM: Pre-Trial in
Chambers

Renae J. Hoff

Plaintiff Kenneth Tiegs & Son's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/17/2006 01 :30 PM)

Renae J. Hoff

Pretrial Conference Order and notice of hearing 4-17-06

Renae J. Hoff

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen Thornburgh, D.O.

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of David A. Martin, M.D.

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Service

Renae J. Hoff

offer of judgment (fax)

Renae J. Hoff

Defendants Robertsons Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate and Reset Renae J. Hoff
Trial (fax)
Interim Hearing Held - motion to continue jury trial granted

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 0411812006 09:OO AM: Hearing
Vacated

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/17/2006 01 :30 PM:
Hearing Vacated

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 06/01/2006 09:OO AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearina result for Conference - Status held on 06/01/2006 09:OO AM:
~ e a r i n gVacated

Renae J. Hoff
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Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petrie

Kenneth Tlegs And Sons vs. Dustin M~chaelKukla, etal.
Kenneth Tlegs And Sons vs Dust~nMichael Kukla, Darrell Robertson

Other Claims
Date

Judge
Notice Of Hearing for scheduling conference 8-16-06 11:30

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/16/2006 11:30 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Fred Rice

Gordon W Petrie

Amended Notice Of Hearing 8-30-06 2 3 0

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/30/2006 02:30 PM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 0813012006 02:30 PM:
Hearing Vacated

Renae J. HoR

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 09/08/2006 10:30 AM)

Renae J. Hoff

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 01/04/2007 01 :30 PM)

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 0911012007 10:OO AM)

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/25/2007 09:30 AM)

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/05/2007 09:OO AM) mo allow
additional expert Discovery

Gordon W Petrie

Def Robertsons Opposition to Plt mo to allow additional expert Discovery
(fax

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/05/2007 09:OO AM: Motion
Held mo allow additional expert Discovery

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/21/2007 09:30 AM) Jury selection

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Motion in limine Re: proposed expert testimony

Gordon W Petrie

Affidavit of David Lloyd

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Hearing

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/06/2007 09:OO AM)

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of law in support of motion in limine
Re: proposed expert testimony

Gordon W Petrie

Notice of depostion duces tecum of Fred Rice

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Pre-trial Memorandum

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/06/2007 09:OO AM: Motion
Held - Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion in Limine

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/06/2007 09:OO AM: Motion
Denied - Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion in Limine

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 0911012007 10:OO AM: Hearing Held

Gordon W Petrie

Plaintiff Unigard Insurance Pre-trial Memorandum

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Proposed Jury Instructions

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Hearing

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/14/2007 02:OO PM)

Gordon W Petrie

Motion for protective order

Gordon W Petrie

Affidavit of David W. Lloyd in support of motion for protective order

Gordon W Petrie

Ex-Parte Motn for order to shorten time

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/14/2007 02:OO PM: Hearing
Vacated - by Yvonne at Lloyd's office

Gordon W Petrie

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Walter J. Kosmatka (fax)

Gordon W Petrie
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Case: CV-2005-0007739-6 Current Judge: Gordon W Petr~e

Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dustln M~chaelKukla, etal.
Kenneth Tlegs And Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson

Other Claims
Date

Judge
Def Roberson's Motion in Limine RE: Plt Sept. 18, 2007 discovery discloser Gordon W Petrie
and amended trial Exhibit List
Affidavit of David W. Lloyd

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/21/2007 0930 AM: Interim Hearing Gordon W Petrie
Held (Jury selection)
Opening Comments and Voir Dire

Gordon W Petrie

Preliminary Instructions

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/25/2007 09:30 AM: Jury Trial
Started

Gordon W Petrie

Mistrial Declared

Gordon W Petrie

Def Robertson's Memorandum of law in support of motn for sum judg on
Plt allegations of negligent entrustment negligence per se and imputed
liability

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Hearing

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/03/2008 09:OO AM) Motn for sum Gordon W Petrie
judg
Affidavit of Darrell L Robertson
Gordon W Petrie
Affidavit of David W Lloyd

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Allegations of Negligent Entrustment,
Negligence Per Se and Imputed Liability

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/03/2008 09:OO AM: Motion
Held Motn for sum judg (UNDER ADVISEMENT)

Gordon W Petrie

Transcript Filed (September 25, 2007)

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/24/2008 09:30 AM) 5 day

Gordon W Petrie

Memorandum Decision On Def Robertsons mo for sum Judgment

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Telephone 02/26/2008 11:00 AM)
telephonic scheduling conference

Gordon W Petrie

Notice Of Hearing

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Conference - Telephone held on 02/26/2008 11:00 AM:
lnterim Hearing Held telephonic scheduling conference

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/24/2008 09:30 AM: Continued 5
day
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/14/2008 09:30 AM) 5 days

Gordon W Petrie
Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 0611612008 10:30 AM)

Gordon W Petrie

Order from Scheduling Conference Setting Status Conference and Jury
Trial

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/02/2008 02:30 PM) mo exclude or Gordon W Petrie
limit testimony
Notice Of Hearing 7-2-08 2:30

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 06/16/2008 10:30 AM:
Interim Hearing Held

Gordon W Petrie
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Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petrie

Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dustin M~chaelKukla, etal.
Kenneth T~egsAnd Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson

Other Claims
Date

Judge
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
Affidavit of David W Lloyd

Gordon W Petrie

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions in
Gordon W Petrie
Limine Re: Admissions of Co-Defendant's Conviction for Vehicular
Manslaughter and Judical Estoppel of Plaintiff's Proposed Testimony, or in
the Alternative, Admission of Plaintiffs' Previous Assertions Regarding
Co-Defendant
Defendant Robertson's Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative,
Motion for Clarification of the Court's Summary Judgment Ruling Re
Negligent Entrustment

Gordon W Petrie

Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support Motion for
Gordon W Petrie
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, Motion for Clarification of the Court's
Summary Judgment Ruling Re: Negligent Entrustment
Defendant Robertson's Motion in Limine Re: Proposed Expert Testimony of Gordon W Petrie
Walter J. Kosmatka
Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion in Limine Gordon W Petrie
Re: Proposed Expert Testimony of Walter J Kosmatka
Affidavit of Mark Erickson

Gordon W Petrie

Affidavit of David W Lloyd

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/02/2008 02:30 PM: Motion
Held mo exclude or limit testimony

Gordon W Petrie

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
Defendant Robertson's Pre-trial Memorandum

Gordon W Petrie

Gordon W Petrie

Defendants Robertson's Proposed Jury Instructions

Gordon W Petrie

Order on Various Motions by Defendant Robertson

Gordon W Petrie

Interim Hearing Held - Motion to allow telephonic testimony

Gordon W Petrie

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: Jury Trial
Started 5 days

Gordon W Petrie

Opening Comments to the Jury

Gordon W Petrie

Opening Jury Instructions

Gordon W Petrie

Preliminary Instructions

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: DAY TWO

Gordon W Petrie

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: Interim Hearing Gordon W Petrie
Held - DAY 3
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: lnterim Hearing Gordon W Petrie
Held - DAY 4
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Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petr~e

Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, etal.
Kenneth T~egsAnd Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson

Other Claims
Date
711812008

1012012008

Judge
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 0930 AM: Interim Hearing Gordon W Petrie
Held - DAY 5
District Court Hearing Held (5 day trial)
Court Reporter: Yvonne Wyde-Gier
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: more than 500
pages
Instructions to the Jury (Final)

Gordon W Petrie

Special Verdict Form

Gordon W Petrie

Gordon W Petrie

Questions by Jury (3)

Gordon W Petrie

Post Verdict Instruction

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 0911512008 10:OO AM) New Trial

Gordon W Petrie

Amended Notice of Hearing

Gordon W Petrie

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 0911512008 10:OO AM: Motion
Held New Trial (Under Advisement)

Gordon W Petrie

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages
Order on Motion for New Trial

Gordon W Petrie

Gordon W Petrie

CANYON COUNW CLERK
C LINDHOLM. DEPUTY
J a n P. Malmberg, P.C.
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY
9 9 N o r t h Main S t r e e t
P o s t O f f i c e Box 364
Logan,Utah 84323-0364
Phane/Fax 435-753-5331
Bar Number:
7127
E-mail:
@mcleodusa.n

JUDICIXL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR CANYON COqNTY

-

KENNETH TIEGS a n d SONS, I N C . a s
s u b r o g e e o f U N I G A R D INSURANCE

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

DUSTIN KUKLA a n d DARRELL
ROBERTSON

C i v i l No.
Judge :

Defendant.

COMES NOW t h e P l a i n t i f f ,
as
Jan

subrogee
P.

of

Unigard

Malmberg,

Defendants,

and

Kenneth T i e g s a n d S o n s ,

Insurance
for

cause

by
of

and

through

action

D u s t i n Kukla a n d D a r r e l l R o b e r t s o n ,

Inc.,

counsel,

against

the

a l l e g e and

complain a s follows:
Complaint, p. 1

I.

NATURE OF ACTION
1.

This

is

a

Insurance
insured,

subrogation

is

stepping

action

wherein

the

into

Kenneth T i e g s & Sons,

shoes

Unigard
of

its

i n order t o pursue

t h i s subroga

11.

was a n i n d i v i d u a l a n d a r e s i d e n t o f Melba, Canyon
County, I d a h o .

3.

At

all

times

relevant

to

this

action

Darrell

R o b e r t s o n was a n i n d i v i d u a l a n d r e s i d e n t o f Kuna,
Ada County, I d a h o .
4.

D u s t i n Kukla was i n v o l v e d i n a t r a c t o r / a u t o m o b i l e
accident
Idaho.

with

Kenneth

Tiegs

in

Canyon

County,

D u s t i n Kukla was d r i v i n g m a c h i n e r y owned

by d e f e n d a n t D a r r e l l R o b e r t s o n .
U n i g a r d I n s u r a n c e i s a company d o i n g b u s i n e s s i n
I d a h o who i n s u r e d Kenneth T i e g s a n d Sons, I n c .
J u r i s d i c t i o n a n d venue a r e p r o p e r i n t h i s C o u r t .

Complaint, p . 2

I.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE
7.

P l a i n t i f f s i n c o r p o r a t e by r e f e r e n c e a l l e g a t i o n s 1
through 6 above.

8.

On J u l y 30, 2003, Kenneth D.
vehicle

owned

by

Kenneth

T i e g s , was d r i v i n g a

Tiegs

and

Sons,

Inc.

when i t s t r u c k t h e r e a r o f a t r a c t o r w i t h t r a i l e r
b e i n g d r i v e n by D u s t i n Kukla a n d owned b y D a r r e l l
Robertson.

9.

The

tractor

pilot

with

vehicle

trailer

and

s p e e d i n a 65 m.p.h.
10.

In

causing

the

was

no

tail

traveling

at

lights
a

or

reduced

t r a v e l zone.

subject

failed t o travel

had

collision,

Dustin

Kukla

s a f e t y on t h e roadway w i t h

the

appropriate t a i l s l i g h t s o r p i l o t vehicle.

11.

In

causing

Robertson,

the

subject

owner

the

collision,

Darrell

tractor

trailer

and

f a i l e d t o make t h e t r a c t o r w i t h t r a i l e r s a f e f o r
d r i v i n g a t n i g h t time.

In particular,

t o provide t h e vehicles with proper

he f a i l e d

tail

o r p i l o t vehicle.

Complaint, p. 3

lights

12.

In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla
failed

to

keep

a

proper

lookout

for

traffic

approaching from the rear when he was

driving

without a pilot vehicle and without tail lights
to notify traffic traveling on said road of the
vehicles' locati

13.

In
failed to operate the vehicles in a

safe and

reasonable fashion.

14.

In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla
failed to operate the vehicles with reasonable
care, particularly under the circumstances.

15.

In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla
was

operating

speed,

which

his

vehicles

was

at

hazardous

a

slow
under

moving
the

circumstances.

16.

In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla
and Darrell Robertson failed to follow the rules
of the road and controlling traffic laws.

Complaint, p. 4

3.7.

The

negligence

Robertson

of

cause

was
the

of

Dustin

the

direct,

collision

Kukla

proximate

involving

Darrell

and

and

Kenneth

sole
Tiegs

and Dustin Kukla.

18.

As a r e s u l t o f t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f D u s t i n K u k l a a n d
D a r r e l l Robertson, Kenneth T i e g s d i e d .

19.

As a r e s u l t o f t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f D u s t i n K u k l a a n d

Darrell

Robertson,

Unigard p a i d

Kenneth

Tiegs

&

Sons, I n c . b e n e f i t s .
111. SUBROGATION

20.

Plaintiffs

incorporate

their

allegations

of

1

through 19 herein.
21.

At

time

the

Kenneth

Tiegs

of

the

&

above-described

Sons,

Inc.

was

negligence,

insured

under

a

c o n t r a c t of insurance with Unigard Insurance.
22.

Unigard

Insurance,

Tiegs

Sons,

&

T i e g s & Sons,

as

Inc.,
Inc.

the

paid

insurer
on

behalf

of

Kenneth

of

Kenneth

$5,000 a s b e n e f i t a r i s i n g o u t

of the accident.

Complaint, p. 5

This payment was necessitated by the negligence
of defendants.

23. Unigard

attempted

to

resolve

this

subrogation

issue prior to filing suit; however, defendants
simply ignored all attempts to resolve.
IV.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Kenneth Tiegs

&

Sons, Inc. as subrogee

of Unigard Insurance prays for Judgment against defendants
as follows:
1.

For the principal sum of no less than $5,000.

2.

For the highest amount of pre-judgment and postjudgment interest thereon allowed by law.

3.

For

all

costs

associated

in

pursuit

of

this

this action.
5.

For such further and additional
seem

appropriate

and

just

to

relief as may
this

Honorable

Court.
Complaint, p. 6

,7

DATED this

&

/--

M
e

day of July, 2005.
PERRY, MALMBERG

&

PERRY

Plaintiff's address :
c/o Afni
P. 0. Box 3068
Bloomington, IL 61702

Complaint, p. 7

DATED this

17

day of July, 2005.
PERRY, MALMBERG

&

PERRY

Plaintiff's address:
c/o Afni
P. 0. Box 3068
Bloomington, IL 61702

Complaint, p. 7
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Rodney R, Saemrn ISBN: 2921
David W. Lloyd ISBN: 5501
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
300 E. Mallad Drive, Suite 370
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone: (208) 336-0484

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Darrell L. Robertson
1N THE IDISI'MCT COURT OF THE 2'JZB.D JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
I

I

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'IY OF CANYON

I
0

I
!
1

I

KENNETH TIECS and SONS, ING as
sobrogee of UNIGMD INSURANCE,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 05-7739

DErnrnrn DArnLL

ROBERTSON'S ANSWER
AND D
~ FOR JURY
A
~
TIRXAIL,

!
I

i

i

I

I

DUSTIN M. KUKLA; and DARRELL L.
ROBERTSON,
Defendants.

Defendant, Darrell L. Robertson, as and for an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, pleads

and alleges as follows;

P1aintif"fs Complaint, and each and every allegation, contained therein, fails to state a
claim against Defendant upon which relief can be panted.

DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWR AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1

1

I

I
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Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, unless
expressly and specificdily hereinafter admitted.
XI.

With regard to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Phintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits the
allegations contained therein,

111.
With regard to paragraphs 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits upo

information and belief that Defendant Kukla was operating a tractor and baler owned by
Defendant Robertson which was involved in an accident with a vehicle being operated by
Kenneth D. Tiegs. With regards to the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 4
of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant is without &formation sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations contained therein, and, therefore, denies the same.

XV.
With regard to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits the
allegations contained therein.

With regard to paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's

Complaint, Defeoda~tincorporates by reference

paragraphs I. to IV. of this Answer as if hlIy set out herein.

DEFENDANT DARRELL. ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2

SAETRLM LAW OFFICES
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VI.
With regad to paragraph 8 of 1PXain.nriffsComplaint, Defendant admits upon idomation

and belief chat on July 30, 2004, Keme& D.Tiegs was driving a vehicle: which struck the rear
of the baler attached to a tractor operated by Defendant Dustin KukIa and owned by Defendant
Darrcll Robertson. With regards to the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8

of PIaintiffs Compl&t, Defendant is without infomation mfficient to f o m a belief as to the

I

1

truth of the allegations contained therein, d

therefore,

denies the same.

With regard to paragraphs 9 through 19 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies each

and every allegation contained therein.

With regard to paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant incorporates by
reference paragraphs I. through VII. of this Answer as if fully set out herein.

I

With regard to paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of PlaintifPs Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information suficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained

therein, and, therefore denies the same.

THIRD DEFENSE
I3ecdent was guilty of contributory/comparative negligence, which negligence
proximately contributed to his injuries and damages, if any, and the negligence of said Decedent

!
I

DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3

SUTRZIIII LAW OFFICES

was at least equal to, or @eater in degree, than any negligence on part of JSefen&nt. fn

asserring this delFense, Defendant does not admit any negligen~eon his behalf, but, to the
contrary, specifically denies all allegations of negligence.

Raintiffs injufies and damges, if any, were caused by t41e supersedhg, iutervening acts
andlor negligence of third persons not parties to this action.

Pl&tiFs injuries and damages, if any, were caused by the supersed
andlor conduct of Defendant Kukla andlow third persons who are not parti

SIXTH DEFENSE
Decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, which negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of said Plaintiff's injuries and damages, if any.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
P l ~ t i f has
f faded to mjtigate its dmages, if any.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
Decedent was guilty of negligent and careless misconduct which
miscondu~tproximately caused andlor contxibu&&to Plaintiffs injuries
NINTH DEFENSE

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claims alleged in the

Complaint.

DEFENDANT D A W L L ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TR.IAL - 4

SAETRUI LAY OFFICES

ooe

Decedent's injjuries and damages, if any, were caused solely by the negligence of
IDedent.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Proper venue fox Ebjs case is in Ada County due to Defendant Robertson residing in said
County.

W W F O W , Defendant, prays fox judgment as foflows;
1.

R ~ t i F r Complaint
s
be dismissed with prejudice and that PI

nothing ther

2.
j

1

I

For Defendant's costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable attorney fees

under Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121; and
3.

Fox such other and M e x r d i d as the Court deems just and proper in the

premises.
DATED this 30th day of August 2005.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defeadant hereby demands a jury trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38.

DEENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 5

-

DATED this 30th day of August 2005,
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES

Atlorneys fdr Darrell L. Robertson

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of August 2005, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing documant to be served by the method ind

Eric S, Rossman
Erica S. PbilIips
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702

U.S,Mail

Terrence R. 'White

U.S. Mail

WHITE PETERSON
5700 &st F r d i n Road
Suite 200
Nampa, ID 83687
Jan P. Malmberg, P.C.
P ~ ~ MALMBERC
Y ,
& PERRY
99 North Main Street

U.S. Mail

P.O.Box 364
Logan, Utah 84323-0364

/

DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6

low and addressed to:

IN THE DTSTNCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICmL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
BRUCE TIEGS, etal.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vs-

DUSTIN M. KUIZA,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV-04-040oi*C
CV-05-07739"c
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Defendant.
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

1
1
1
1
1
1

KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., etal.,)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
DUSTIN M. KUKIA,
Defendant,
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
are being sent as exhibits as requested in the Notice of Appeal:
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Lodged 11-3-05

GKRTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

- ------*-a,

In the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho
BRUCE TIECS. individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIEGS; and
SUSAN HUTER, individually and as copersonal representative of the Estate of
Kenneth Tiegs, and K.P. INC., an Idaho
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO AUGMENT EXHIBITS AND
REPORTER'S TRANSCNPT

DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,

)

Supreme Court Docket No. 35921-2008
Canyon County District Court Nos.
2004-4001/2005-7739

Defendant-Appellant,

)

)

DUSTIN M. KUKLA,

........................................................

KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., as
subrogee of UNIGARD INSURANCE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant,

DUSTIN M. KUKLA,

A MOTION TO AUGMENT EXHIBITS AND REPORTER'S TRAhTSCRIPT with
attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on February 8, 2010. The Court is fully advised;
therefore, good cause appearing,

L+&*"&N~

9-

t
a

4

I

I

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT be, and hereby is,
GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed below with
t h ~ sCourt witfun twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order and the District Court Clerk shall
immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall be filed
with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1 :

i

1. Transcript of the portions of the trial held on July 14-18, 2008, wherein the parties and
the District Court discussed the following:
a. jury instructions;
b. special verdict form; and
c. Motion to Dismiss made by Appellant ,at the end of Respondent's case and the
proceedings thereon.
(Court Reporter Yvonne Hyde-Gier) (estimate length of pages: 20)

~

I

d

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied &s Motion:
1. Final Jury Instructions, file stamped July 18, 2008; and
2. Special Verdict Form, file stamped July 18, 2008.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in this appeal are SUSPENDED until the
requested portions of the transcript listed above are filed with this Court.
DATED this

cc:

9

day of March 20 10.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
Court Reporter Yvonne Hyde-Gier

A+

Ih

Ill

ibit C From:
d a ~oft John M. Howell in Support of Defendant
Michael Kdda's Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 11-3-05
(Confidentid Under Seal)
Dckfendmt Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Summary Judmerrt, Lodged 2-8-06
Memormdum in Opposition to Defendant Mike KukJa's Motion kbr
Summary Judgment, Lodged 2-23-06
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion
for Summary Judgment, Lodged 2-23-06
Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Lodged 3-1-06
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

day of

,2009.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIJXI JUDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
BRUCE TIEGS, etal.,
Plairitiffs-Responden-ts,
-17sDUSTIN M. KUKLA,
Defendant.
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., etal.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
DUSTIN M. K U U ,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV-04-o4ooi*C
CV -05-07739°C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

Defendant,
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
I, WILLTAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including specific documents as requested, however
there are no duplicate documents in case number CV-og-07739"C.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
?.
i

/\

the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

day of

1 1

'

c k L i

C ih
?-

2009.

WILLTAM H. IIURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIFZD JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
BRUCE TIEGS, etal.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vs-

1
1
1
1
1

Supreme court NO. 35921
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

DUSTIN M. KUKIA,
Defendant.
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., eta1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
DUSTIN M. f(UKI.A,
Defendant,
and
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Clerk's Record and one copy of the Report:er's Transcript to the aaorney of record to each
party as follows:

Rodney R. Saetrum and David W. Lloyd, SmTRUM LAW OFFICES,
P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707
Eric S. Rossman and Chad M. Nicholson, R O S S W LAW GROUP, PLLC,
737 N. 7th Street, Boise, Idaho 83702
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
P

the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this

b

i
;

day of

'

/ 1

I#,

1-3

! ,* ii

,2009.

WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

